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ABSTRACT
This Article explores an underappreciated legacy of the Supreme
Court’s (in)famous decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States. Although Holy Trinity has been much discussed in the
academic literature and in judicial opinions, the discussion thus far
has focused almost exclusively on the first half of the Court’s
opinion—which declares that the “spirit” of a statute should trump
its “letter”—and relies on legislative history to help divine that spirit.
Scholars and jurists have paid little, if any, attention to the opinion’s
lengthy second half. In that second half, the Court tells a detailed
narrative about the country’s historically Christian roots and
explains that, other interpretive rules aside, the statute simply cannot
be construed against the church because the United States “is a
Christian nation.”
This Article maps the methodology of the Holy Trinity Court’s
Christian-nation argument and contends that that methodology
constitutes an interpretive canon in its own right—one which
perhaps aptly can be called the “unique national institution” canon.
The Article goes on to demonstrate that this interpretative canon has
reared its head in a number of statutory interpretation cases decided
since Holy Trinity.
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INTRODUCTION
In his dissenting opinion in Zuni Public School District No. 89 v.
Department of Education,1 Justice Scalia lamented that the major-
ity’s statutory analysis resurrected “Church of the Holy Trinity ...
Phoenix-like, from the ashes.”2 He was referring, of course, to Holy
Trinity Church v. United States,3 an 1892 case that has become a
titan in the field of statutory interpretation. At issue in Holy Trinity
was the Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885,4 which made it illegal for
employers to pay the migration costs of aliens under contract to
perform “labor or service of any kind” in the United States.5 The
government sought to apply the statute against a church that had
paid the migration costs for an English clergyman under contract to
become the church’s rector. Relying in part on House and Senate
committee reports, the Supreme Court famously declared that “a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers.”6 The Court went on to conclude that the church’s conduct
was not prohibited because Congress intended for the statute to
apply only to contracts to import manual laborers—not to contracts
involving the importation of “brain toilers.”7
Holy Trinity is known, in the annals of statutory interpretation,
as a turning point in the judicial use of internal legislative history8
1. 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
2. Id. at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
4. 23 Stat. 332 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2164 (1901)), superceded by Act of
Mar. 3, 1903, Pub. L. No. 162, 32 Stat. 1214.
5. Id.
6. 143 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 464.
8. Internal legislative history is distinct from external legislative history in that it
focuses on the intralegislative record of discussion, deliberation, and voting on the bill that
eventually was enacted, whereas external legislative history focuses on a statute’s evolution
over the years, through amendments actually enacted by the legislature. AHARON BARAK,
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 347-49 (2005). The difference between external and
internal legislative history boils down to the difference between what happened at various
points in time versus what legislators said about what happened. Id.; see also United States
v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39-40 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). British and American courts, and
ardent textualists like Justice Scalia, long have been willing to rely on the external evolution
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to trump a statute’s clear text.9 As Justice Scalia’s Zuni dissent
suggests, the case is a perennial target for textualists seeking to
confine statutory interpretation to the text and nothing but the
text10 and, conversely, a beacon for intentionalists seeking to
emphasize legislative purpose and intent as the touchstones of the
interpretive process.11
In accord with its contentious place in legal history, scholars and
judges have spilt considerable ink analyzing Holy Trinity. Adrian
Vermeule has argued that the Holy Trinity Court misread the
relevant legislative history and suggested that the case should
serve as a cautionary example of judicial incompetence accurately
to decipher legislative history.12 Carol Chomsky has argued that
Holy Trinity was decided correctly when viewed in light of both the
historical context within which the Alien Contract Labor Act was
enacted and the jurisprudential context within which the Court
rendered its decision.13 Justice Scalia has addressed Holy Trinity in
countless lectures and in his book on statutory interpretation,
calling it the “prototypical” example of how a statute ought not to be
of a statute as evidence of statutory meaning; it is reliance on internal legislative debates and
discussions that sharply has divided intentionalists and textualists.
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 209 (1994)
(calling the case a “sensation” with respect to the use of legislative history); Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity
Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1835 (1998) (commenting that Holy Trinity “elevated
legislative history to new prominence by overturning the traditional rule that barred judicial
recourse to internal legislative history”).
10. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 18-23 (Amy Gutman ed.,
1997) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION] (describing Holy Trinity as the “prototypical case
involving the triumph of supposed ‘legislative intent’ ... over the text of the law”); Vermeule,
supra note 9, at 1837-38 (arguing that the Court’s incompetence at evaluating legislative
history in Holy Trinity should serve as a warning of judicial ineptness at using legislative
history to interpret statutes generally).
11. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at 115, 118
(discussing Scalia’s interpretation of Holy Trinity); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in
INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at 65, 92-93 (responding to Scalia’s criticisms of the Holy
Trinity holding); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529,
542-50 (1997) (using Holy Trinity to criticize Justice Scalia’s textualist approach to statutory
interpretation).
12. Vermeule, supra note 9.
13. Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History
in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 922-24, 944-46 (2000).
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interpreted and deriding it as the precedent cited “whenever counsel
wants us to ignore the narrow, deadening text of the statute, and
pay attention to the life-giving legislative intent. It is nothing but
an invitation to judicial lawmaking.”14 Justice Kennedy similarly
has criticized Holy Trinity as a case that empowers courts “to rum-
mage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the
legislation in order to discover an alternative interpretation of the
statute with which the Court is more comfortable.”15 Perhaps most
instructively, Philip Frickey tells his students that “Holy Trinity
Church is the case you always cite when the text is hopelessly
against you.”16
The conventional wisdom, upon which critics as well as admirers
of the case agree, is that Holy Trinity’s interpretive legacy lies in the
directive that courts should privilege the spirit, as illuminated by
legislative history, over the letter of the law.17 This Article suggests
that Holy Trinity has another, underappreciated, legacy: its
Christian-nation argument. The little-discussed second half of the
Court’s Holy Trinity opinion presents an impassioned, lengthy
overview of the United States’ history and status as a Christian
nation and reasons that against this backdrop, Congress simply
could not have intended for the Alien Contract Labor Act to prohibit
contracts by churches to pay the passage of Christian ministers.18 As
this Article explains, that national-history-invoking approach to
interpreting statutes—which I shall call the “unique national
institution” canon—has endured, even if the Holy Trinity Court’s
characterization of the United States as a Christian nation has not.
In fact, since its inauguration19 in Holy Trinity, the unique
national institution canon has reared its head in at least four
prominent Supreme Court cases.20 Like Holy Trinity, all four of
these cases resulted in controversial statutory constructions
14. Scalia, supra note 10, at 18, 21.
15. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
16. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 247 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Chomsky, supra note 13, at 940; Scalia, supra note 10, at 20-21.
18. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-72 (1892).
19. To my knowledge, Holy Trinity is the first Supreme Court case to use this kind of
“unique national institution” argument to interpret a statute.
20. See infra Part II.
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excepting one class of “unique national” litigants from the relevant
statute’s reach. And although none of the later cases directly
referenced Holy Trinity—likely because the Christian-nation lan-
guage offended twentieth-century sensibilities21—each case relied
significantly on arguments cast in the “Christian nation” mold to
justify the creation of a statutory exception.
Part I of this Article examines the overlooked second half of the
Holy Trinity opinion. Upon inspection, the opinion’s Christian-
nation passages emerge as more than just an unabashed admission
of the judicial prejudices underlying the Court’s statutory interpre-
tation. In fact, they amount to a carefully-constructed narrative
about the unique national status of the Christian religion, employed
as an authoritative guide to legislative intent. Part II explores the
Court’s adaptation of the unique national institution exception in
four leading twentieth-century statutory interpretation cases.
Section A discusses parallels between Holy Trinity’s Christian-
nation construct and the ode to baseball that opens the Court’s
opinion in Flood v. Kuhn. Section B locates Justice Rehnquist’s
homage to railroads in Leo Sheep v. United States within Holy
Trinity’s unique national institution tradition. Section C illuminates
the role that tobacco’s unique historical stature played in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson. And Section D examines the Native American
usurpation narrative undergirding the Court’s opinion in Morton v.
Mancari. Part III then considers the theoretical implications of the
unique national institution canon, situating it within larger in-
terpretive debates about text versus intent and the proper scope of
judicial inquiry in statutory interpretation cases. 
I. HOLY TRINITY’S OTHER INTERPRETIVE PRECEDENT
To the extent that it has been discussed at all, the Christian-
nation portion of the Holy Trinity opinion generally has been
dismissed as a nineteenth-century embarrassment beyond which we
21. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring
to Holy Trinity as an “aberration” to the avoidance of “government sponsored endorsement
of religion”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717-18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the suggestion that the United States was a “Christian nation”); MORTON BORDEN,
JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS 125-29 (1984) (noting the hypocrisy of nineteenth-century church-
state separation).
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as a nation have grown,22 or as a declaration by one religious jus-
tice23 that has had little impact on the subsequent development of
American law.24 In a curious but telling tic, commentators tend to
refer to “Justice Brewer’s” opinion rather than “the Court’s opinion”
when talking about the Christian-nation argument.25 But in their
rush to distance the Court and the law from the Christian-nation
argument, commentators have missed the forest for the trees. That
is, they have missed the methodological innovation underlying the
Holy Trinity Court’s second, independent basis for its ruling.
Remarkably, the second half of the Holy Trinity opinion declared
that, irrespective of all the interpretive rules discussed earlier in
the opinion, including “spirits” and legislative history, the Alien
Contract Labor Act could not be read to prohibit the church’s action
because “no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any
legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.”26
This was, the Court explained, “historically true.”27 The Court then
launched into what can only be described as a history lesson, com-
plete with documentary exhibits, marshaled to prove the Court’s
point that the United States is a Christian nation.
22. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 717-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling the Court’s approval
of the public display of a creche “a long step backwards to the days when Justice Brewer could
arrogantly declare for the Court that ‘this is a Christian nation’” (quoting Holy Trinity, 143
U.S. at 471)); United States v. Johnson, 25 F.3d 1335, 1341 (6th Cir. 1994) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) (“A century ago, when Church of the Holy Trinity was decided, the kind of cultural
diversity that now characterizes our nation and its public servants still lay in the future. It
was thus still possible to suggest ... that ‘this is a Christian nation.’” (quoting Holy Trinity,
143 U.S. at 471)); ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
that “[a]s late as 1892 the Supreme Court could state in the manner of a truism, ‘this is a
Christian nation,’” but finding that America and the Supreme Court had changed so
substantially since then that a city could not constitutionally display a Latin cross during the
Christmas season (quoting Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 471)).
23. See, e.g., Steven K. Green, Justice David Josiah Brewer and the “Christian Nation”
Maxim, 63 ALB. L. REV. 427, 427 (1999).
24. Chomsky, supra note 13, at 903.
25. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 717-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Holy Trinity, 143
U.S. at 471) (faulting Justice Brewer for “arrogantly declar[ing] for the Court that ‘this is a
Christian nation’”); Chomsky, supra note 13, at 903 (crediting Justice Brewer with the
comment that “this is a religious people,” noting that “Brewer found ‘a volume of unofficial
declarations [and a] mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation,’” and calling
it “Brewer’s declaration” that the United States is a “Christian nation”); Green, supra note
23, passim.
26. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465.
27. Id.
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Exhibit 1 in the Court’s history lesson was the commission given
to Christopher Columbus by Ferdinand and Isabella, which invoked
“the grace of God,” and expressed the “hope[ ] that by God’s assis-
tance some of the continents and islands in the ocean will be
discovered.”28 Exhibit 2 was the first colonial grant, made to Sir
Walter Raleigh in 1584 from “Elizabeth, by the grace of God” and
conveying the authority to enact statutes, provided that the statutes
“be not against the true Christian faith nowe professed in the
Church of England.”29 The next several exhibits included: the first
charter of Virginia and, by extrapolation, the charters granted to
other colonies, which list “propagating of Christian Religion” as one
of the Colonies’ purposes (Exhibit 3);30 the Mayflower Compact,
which invokes the “Presence of God ” and declares itself “undertaken
for the Glory of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith”
(Exhibit 4);31 the fundamental orders of Connecticut, which
repeatedly invoke God and “our Lord Jesus” (Exhibit 5);32 the
charter of privileges granted by William Penn to the province of
Pennsylvania (Exhibit 6);33 the Declaration of Independence, which
references the “Creator” and the “Supreme Judge of the world”
(Exhibit 7);34 the constitutions of the forty-four states then in
existence (Exhibit 8);35 the freedom of religion and Sunday exception
for vetoes found in the United States Constitution (Exhibit 9);36
other judicial utterances (Exhibit 10);37 the appeal to the “Almighty”
in most oaths of office (Exhibit 11);38 the custom of opening sessions
of all deliberative bodies with prayer (Exhibit 12);39 the prefatory
words of all wills, “In the name of God, amen,” (Exhibit 13);40 and
laws respecting the observance of the Sabbath (Exhibit 14).41 This
28. Id. at 465-66 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 467.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 468.
36. Id. at 470.
37. Id. at 470-71.
38. Id. at 471.
39. Id.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id.
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marshaling of historical evidence occupies a full six pages of the
Court’s opinion.42
Once the Court finished quoting from historical documents
(Exhibits 1-10), it observed that “[t]here is a universal language
pervading them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm
that this is a religious nation.”43 The Court further pressed this
point by cataloguing common American customs that invoke a
Christian God (Exhibits 11-14), noting that such common practices
“add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic
utterances [historical documents] that this is a Christian nation.”44
Having thus painted the historical landscape, the Court played its
trump card, asking: “In the face of all these [utterances and
practices], shall it be believed that a Congress of the United States
intended to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this country to
contract for the services of a Christian minister residing in another
nation?”45 The answer to this rhetorical question was meant to be a
resounding “no.” After all, the Court’s antecedent history lesson had
demonstrated that “the whole history and life of the country”46
would be undermined by a law punishing the church’s conduct.
Against this historical backdrop, the Court insisted, the church’s
actions simply “could not have been intentionally legislated
against.”47
Thus employed, the Christian-nation argument emerges as an
early example of what modern statutory interpretation scholars call
“substantive canons” of statutory construction. Substantive canons
are rules of construction that are based on background policies or
presumptions.48 They “reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded
in the court’s understanding of how to treat statutory text with
reference to judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-
enactment common law practices, or specific statutorily based
policies.”49 The Holy Trinity Court’s Christian-nation argument is
42. Id. at 465-71.
43. Id. at 470.
44. Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 472.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 276.
49. James Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
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a classic formulation, as it articulates a particular understanding of
how statutory text should be understood with reference to judicially
perceived history, common practice, and quasi-constitutional pri-
orities (for example, references to Founding-era documents, and
state and federal constitutions) respecting the Christian religion.
But the Holy Trinity Court used the Christian-nation rationale as
more than just a presumption; it cited the history as a definitive
guidepost against which to measure legislative intent—concluding
that given our nation’s historical commitment to Christianity, it was
unthinkable that Congress could have intended for any statute to
prohibit the church’s behavior. All substantive canons do this to
some extent; their modus operandi is to tip the interpretive scales
in favor of a statutory construction that preserves background
societal or constitutional norms, on the theory that Congress is
familiar with those norms and generally loath to contravene them.
But substantive canons also typically acknowledge Congress’s power
to contravene background norms if it so chooses, and courts tend to
invoke substantive canons only when the statutory text is unclear.50
The Holy Trinity Court’s Christian-nation argument went one
step further, invoking the background norm to trump an otherwise
clear statutory text. Such use of a substantive canon is rare, though
not entirely unparalleled. There is one brand of substantive canon
that ignores the invoke-only-when-the-text-is-ambiguous principle:
clear statement rules. Clear statement rules mandate a strong
presumption that Congress does not intend for the statutes it enacts
to violate certain accepted background norms—primarily those
based on the Federal Constitution—and are rebuttable only where
the statute on its face clearly expresses an intent to trump a
particular background norm.51 Clear statement rules change the
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005).
50. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271 (2008) (“The canon of consti-
tutional avoidance comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual
analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction; and the canon
functions as a means of choosing between them. We cannot ignore the text and purpose of a
statute in order to save it.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Richlin Sec. Serv. Co.
v. Chertoff, 128 S. Ct. 2007, 2019 (2008) (refusing to apply the substantive canon about
narrow construction to waivers of sovereign immunity, noting that substantive canons are
only a guide to statutory meaning and that text and other canons pointed clearly in favor of
ruling against the government).
51. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity
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interpretive default rule so that when certain constitutional norms
are at stake (such as the nondelegation doctrine, separation of
powers, federalism), it is not enough for the text of the statute
unambiguously to cover the situation at hand; instead, the text
must go one step further and clearly express Congress’s intent to
supercede the relevant background norm. This is rather like the
result that the Holy Trinity Court achieved with its Christian-
nation rationale, arguing that it did not matter how “broad the
language of the statute”52 was or how well within its “letter”53 the
church’s action might seem because, given the country’s background
Christian traditions and constitutive nature as a Christian nation,
the overwhelming presumption was that Congress simply could not
have intended to outlaw the church’s behavior. In other words,
nothing short of a declaration on the face of the statute that
contracts for labor between a church and a foreign minister are
covered would have convinced the Court to interpret the statute to
govern the church’s action.
Of course, the Court did not come out and state this, and so did
not actually articulate a clear statement rule. In fact, it was not
even thinking in this vein; rather, it was convinced that Congress
could not possibly have intended to interfere with a church’s
employment practices. The Court’s Christian-nation argument
assumed (or sought to prove) that Christianity is so central to the
American way of life that Congress could not have intended for the
statute at issue to apply to Christian churches; that is, it created an
exception from the general rule for a special national institu-
tion—Christian churches.
Put simply, the logical progression of the Court’s Christian
nation, or unique national institution, analysis is as follows: 
1. The statute at issue is general and clearly prohibits the
church’s action if straightforwardly applied.
2. However, the United States is a Christian nation which is
evidenced by Historical Exhibits 1-14.54
Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 565 (2008) (discussing the Court’s insistence on
a clear statement rule in waiver of federal sovereign immunity cases).
52. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472.
53. Id. at 458.
54. See supra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
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3. Therefore, it is unthinkable that Congress could have
meant for the statute to prohibit the employment practices
of a church and we must read the statute to except this
unique national institution from the general rule.
Note that the canon can take on different substantive content if the
underlined word in each sentence is changed. That is, the Christian-
nation argument can become a “We are a (blank) nation, and
therefore Congress could not have intended for the relevant statute
to cover (blank)” argument with only a little adjustment and
different historical exhibits. In fact, as the next Part demonstrates,
the Supreme Court subsequently has used just this kind of tweak on
the “Christian nation” argument to reason its way into special
statutory exemptions for four historic American entities: baseball,
railroads, tobacco, and Native Americans.
II. HOLY TRINITY’S UNIQUE NATIONAL INSTITUTION          
DESCENDANTS
A word is in order here to make clear what Holy Trinity’s unique
national institution canon (and this Article) is not about. The
interpretive approach this Article seeks to highlight is not the
Supreme Court’s mere reliance on, or even poetic recounting of,
some aspect of American history to support its resolution of a given
case. So, for example, this Article does not examine the historical
narratives employed in constitutional cases such as Texas v.
Johnson,55 in which Justice Rehnquist marshaled poetry, song, and
historic incidents to argue that the American flag is “the visible
symbol embodying our Nation” and that a Texas statute prohib-
iting flag burning could not violate the First Amendment,56 or
Boumediene v. Bush,57 which valorized the Great Writ en route to
concluding that the Military Commissions Act58 unconstitutionally
suspends Guantanamo prisoners’ habeas corpus rights. The reason
55. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
56. Id. at 422-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In the same vein is Justice Rehnquist’s
dissent in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 600-04 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (involving
a flag-misuse statute and a petitioner who had sewn a small flag to the seat of his pants).
57. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244-51 (2008) (providing an extensive history lesson on the evolution
of the writ of habeas corpus).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
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for these omissions and others of their kind is twofold. First, resort
to American history and tradition—not to mention the Framers’
original understanding—is a common and accepted analytic device
in constitutional interpretation,59 whereas it is an unusual and
somewhat objectionable one in statutory interpretation. Indeed,
there would have been nothing novel or remarkable about Holy
Trinity’s Christian-nation argument if it had been made in the
context of interpreting the Free Exercise Clause rather than a
federal statute. The Constitution is designed to order our national
government and to prescribe the relationship between that govern-
ment and the people, as well as between the various constitutive
parts of the state and national governments, for all time (unless
amended, and amendment is difficult). Statutes, by contrast, are
meant to govern particular policy areas and are subject to legislative
amendment or repeal by a simple majority.60 Interpretation of the
Constitution thus naturally invites, and perhaps even demands,
attention to our nation’s history and traditions. Interpretation of
statutes, by contrast, typically involves inquiry into only the
meaning of statutory text or, if the text is ambiguous, the particular
circumstances that prompted a statute’s enactment. Thus, when the
Court uses national history or tradition to decide what a statute
59. For this reason, cases are legion in which the Court uses a narrative about American
history or tradition to determine whether a particular right claimed by a litigant is
fundamental or established enough to be protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Boumediene,
128 S. Ct. at 2244-51 (recounting the history of the writ of habeas corpus); Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688-89 (2005) (“[A]cknowledgments of the role played by the Ten
Commandments in our Nation’s heritage are common throughout America .... a large statue
of Moses holding the Ten Commandments, alongside a statue of the Apostle Paul, has
overlooked the rotunda of the Library of Congress’s Jefferson Building since 1897.”);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (“We now inquire whether this asserted
right [to commit suicide] has any place in our Nation’s traditions” and concluding that it does
not); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (finding no fundamental right for
homosexuals to engage in consensual sexual relations); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786
(1983) (“The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer
is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country. From colonial times through
the founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted
with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom.”).
60. Some “super-statutes” may be different and share more in common with the
Constitution. See William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1215-17, 1272-76 (2001) (describing super-statutes and comparing them favorably to the
“constitutional moments” that produced the New Deal or the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments).
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means in a particular case, it is playing an interpretive trump card
that changes the usual rules about how statutes are to be con-
strued—that is, through reliance on plain text, language canons,
and narrow legislative history.
Second, the manner in which the Court uses historical narratives
in constitutional cases differs materially from how it uses historical
narratives to create a unique national institution exception in
statutory interpretation cases. In constitutional cases, the Court
typically references American history or traditions to demonstrate
that an individual right claimed by a litigant—such as the right to
determine the manner of one’s own death,61 or the right to engage
in consensual homosexual relations62—contradicts longstanding
public values or practices and therefore cannot be protected under
the Constitution. Less often, as in Boumediene, the Court employs
historical references to show that the claimed right is consistent
with longstanding national values or traditions and therefore must
be respected in the present case.63 By contrast, in statutory interpre-
tation cases (think Holy Trinity), the Court references American
history and tradition in order to establish that a particular entity’s
unique national status entitles it to exemption from a rule dictated
by the relevant statute. In other words, the historical narratives told
by the Court in constitutional interpretation cases focus on the
action or practice engaged in by the litigant, whereas the narratives
told in statutory interpretation cases focus on the iconic status of the
61. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (“[W]e are confronted with a consistent and almost
universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject
it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, we would
have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice.”).
62. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (“Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original
13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until
1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia
continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between
consenting adults. Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct
is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty’ is, at best, facetious.” (internal citations omitted)).
63. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244-51 (noting that the history of habeas corpus writ
shows that defendants are entitled to greater procedural protections than are provided for in
the Military Commissions Act).
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entity subject to regulation.64 Thus, the logical progression of the
interpretive analysis dictated by the unique national institution
canon in Holy Trinity and other statutory interpretation cases is
decidedly different from the logical progression of the analysis
generated by the Court’s resort to historical tradition in constitu-
tional cases. Compare, for example, the Christian-nation syllogism
outlined above with the following syllogism for the Court’s constitu-
tional narratives:
TABLE 1
Statutory Cases
(Holy Trinity)
Constitutional Cases
(Washington v. Gluckberg)
1. The statute at issue is general
and clearly prohibits the church’s
action if straightforwardly 
applied.
1. The Constitution confers on all
citizens the right to due
process of law, but is silent as 
to the specific contours of that
right. The defendant claims 
that due process includes a 
fundamental right to take one’s
own life.
2. However, the United States is
a Christian nation.
2. However, taking one’s own life
is repugnant to our nation’s 
historical traditions.
3. Therefore, it is unthinkable
that Congress could have meant
for the statute to prohibit the
employment practices of churches
and we must read the statute to
except this unique national 
institution from the general rule.
3. Therefore, the Constitution
cannot protect the right of any
individual, including the 
defendant, to take his own life.
64. Moreover, the litigants in constitutional interpretation cases are seeking to have their
actions declared included and protected under the Constitution’s deliberately vague provisions
(guaranteeing, for example, “equal protection,” “due process,” or “free speech”), whereas the
litigants (or their representatives) in statutory interpretation cases are seeking to be declared
exempt from seemingly clear statutory provisions (for example, the Alien Contract Labor Act
provision prohibiting “employers” from importing foreign “laborers”).
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In other words, when the Court uses a historical narrative in
constitutional rights cases, it does so not to create a special excep-
tion from the general rule on behalf of a unique, privileged entity,
but to deny that the Constitution protects the right of any individual
to engage in the behavior at issue in the case. Whereas statutory
interpretation cases use the “unique national institution” canon to
carve out an exception to a general rule in a manner that benefits
a particular litigant or related entity, constitutional interpretation
cases use historical narratives to create a general rule of nonrec-
ognition for an asserted right in a manner that strips not just the
individual bringing the lawsuit, but all individuals living in the
United States, of the relevant right. 
Given these substantial differences in the Court’s use of national
narratives in statutory versus constitutional cases, the focus of this
Article is limited to the former context—that is, statutory interpre-
tation cases in which the Court employs a national narrative about
the unique, privileged status of a particular national institution as
dispositive evidence of statutory meaning. As Holy Trinity and the
cases discussed in Sections A, B, C, and D below show, the unique
national institution exception to statutory interpretation involves
two distinct components: (1) a deliberate weaving together of
historical episodes, social traditions, and national identity into a
story about the special role that a particular entity has played in
American history or society, and (2) a reliance on that story as
conclusive evidence that Congress could not have intended for the
statute in question to disadvantage this “unique American” entity.
Successful use of the unique national institution exception in the
statutory context thus requires the Court first to construct, or at
least invoke, a nostalgic narrative about American life and then to
declare that: “Of course Congress didn’t mean to impose a burden on
that entity—why, that would be un-American! ” In Holy Trinity, the
privileged entity was Christian churches; in the first case discussed
below, it was baseball.
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A. Flood v. Kuhn
Flood 65 is a fascinating 1972 case involving an antitrust action
brought by major league baseball player Curtis Flood. Flood played
for the St. Louis Cardinals for twelve seasons, until the ball club
decided to trade him to the Philadephia Phillies at the start of his
thirteenth season.66 The reserve clause in the standard major league
baseball contract gave Flood no right to be consulted and no choice
regarding the trade.67 He complained, seeking to be made a free
agent with liberty to strike his own deal with the team of his
choice.68 When his request was denied, he brought suit against the
Commissioner of Baseball, the presidents of the two major leagues,
and the twenty-four major league clubs then in existence, alleging
that the reserve system violated federal antitrust laws, federal civil
rights statutes, state statutes, the common law, and the Thirteenth
Amendment.69 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the
focus was on Flood’s antitrust claims, which alleged that the reserve
clause constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.70
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Flood began with a simple
statement of the statutory issue before it—whether baseball’s re-
serve system falls within the reach of the federal antitrust
laws71—and then launched into a four-page poetic tribute to the
sport and its history. That tribute, which garnered its own separate
part titled “The Game,” was far more sentimental than the Holy
Trinity Court’s Christian-nation passages, but provided an analo-
gous chronicling of baseball’s historical place in American society.72
65. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
66. Id. at 264-65.
67. Id. at 259 n.1.
68. Id. at 265.
69. Id. at 265-66.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
71. The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits, in relevant part, “[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). Flood argued that baseball’s reserve clause
restrained commerce by preventing players from freely negotiating and contracting with the
team of their choice. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
72. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 260-64. Only two other Justices joined this part of the Court’s
opinion; Justices White and Burger refused to sign on, though they joined the rest of the
opinion, including later parts relying on baseball’s “status in the life of the nation” and the
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The Court opened its unique national institution narrative with
three sentimental recollections about professional baseball’s origins.
First, it recalled that “[i]t is a century and a quarter since the New
York Nine defeated the Knickerbockers 23 to 1 on Hoboken’s
Elysian Fields June 19, 1846.... The teams were amateur, but the
contest marked a significant date in baseball’s beginnings.”73
(Exhibit 1). Second, the Court reminded readers that “[t]he
Cincinnati Red Stockings came into existence in 1869 upon an
outpouring of local pride .... [T]his professional team traveled over
11,000 miles that summer, winning 56 games and tying one.”74
(Exhibit 2). And third, the Court noted that “on St. Patrick’s Day in
1871, the National Association of Professional Baseball Players was
founded and the professional league was born.”75 (Exhibit 3). All
three of these episodes were recounted as though they were historic
events taught to all schoolchildren.
The Court then declared that “[t]he ensuing colorful days are well
known”76 and launched into a remarkable paragraph full of baseball
references and trivia. Exhibits 4-20 in the Court’s sentimental
history of baseball reminded readers of: General Abner Doubleday
(Exhibit 4);77 the formation of the National League in 1876 (Exhibit
5);78 Chicago’s supremacy in the first year under Al Spalding and
with Cap Anson at third base (Exhibit 6);79 the formation of the
American Association and the Union Association in the 1880s
(Exhibit 7);80 the introduction of Sunday baseball (Exhibit 8);81
interleague warfare through cut-rate admission prices and player
raiding (Exhibit 9);82 the development of the reserve clause (Exhibit
10);83 the formation of the Brotherhood of Professional Ball Players
need to “protect the integrity of the game.” Id. at 258, 266, 272.
73. Id. at 260-61.
74. Id. at 261.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
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and the Players League (Exhibit 11);84 the appearance of the
American League, or “junior circuit” (Exhibit 12);85 the first World
Series in 1903, disruption in 1904, and resumption in 1905 (Exhibit
13);86 the short-lived Federal League on the majors’ scene during
World War I (Exhibit 14);87 the infamous 1919 World Series (Exhibit
15);88 the home run ball (Exhibit 16);89 the shifting of franchises
(Exhibit 17);90 the expansion of the leagues (Exhibit 18);91 the
installation in 1965 of the major league draft (Exhibit 19);92 and the
formation of the Major League Baseball Players Association in 1966
(Exhibit 20).93 Notably, the Court deftly sandwiched the adoption of
the reserve clause between a host of other developments in baseball
history, making it appear both an inevitable and imbedded part of
the sport.
But the Court’s tribute to baseball’s unique place in American
society did not stop there. The Court went on to expend an entire
page listing “the many names, celebrated for one reason or another,
that have sparked the diamond and its environs and that have
provided tinder for recaptured thrills, for reminiscence and com-
parisons, and for conversation and anticipation in-season and off-
season.”94 The list is eighty-eight names long and includes such
baseball legends as Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Jackie
Robinson, Joe McCarthy, and Charles Comiskey (Exhibit 21).95
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 261-62.
87. Id. at 262.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 262-63. An oft-recited anecdote relates that Justice Blackmun’s list of all-time
baseball greats originally listed only white ballplayers; Justice Marshall apparently pointed
this out, prompting Blackmun, who was hoping for Marshall’s vote, to add Jackie Robinson,
Satchel Paige, and Roy Campanella to the list. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 191 (1979). That anecdote recently has been
challenged as false. See BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD’S FIGHT FOR FREE
AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 301 (2006) (arguing that the anecdote “makes no sense” and
citing letters from Justice Blackmun’s case files denying it); Ross E. Davies, A Tall Tale of The
Brethren, 33 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 186, 195 (2008) (examining drafts of Blackmun’s opinion and
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Finally, the Court made reference to Ring Lardner’s “World Serious”
comment (Exhibit 22) and to two famous baseball poems, “Casey at
the Bat” (Exhibit 23) and “Baseball’s Sad Lexicon” (Exhibit 24).96 In
conclusion, the Court explained that these popular references,
combined with “all the other happenings, habits, and superstitions
about and around baseball” have made it the “national pastime.”97
Although these passages read more like a sportswriter’s tribute
to a game he loves than a Supreme Court opinion, they, like the
Christian-nation passages in Holy Trinity, laid a foundation for the
Court to argue that baseball is “the national pastime,” that America
is a Baseball nation, so to speak, and that the antitrust laws should
not be interpreted in a way that interferes with this venerable
American sport. Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not quite
have to come out and declare all of this on its own authority;
instead, it was able to quote at length from the lower court’s opinion
denying Flood a preliminary injunction.98 That opinion, though not
containing the sentimental history of baseball provided in the
Supreme Court’s opinion, observed that:
Baseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred
years and enjoys a unique place in our American heritage. Major
league professional baseball is avidly followed by millions of
fans, looked upon with fervor and pride and provides a special
source of inspiration and competitive team spirit especially for
the young.
Baseball’s status in the life of the nation is so pervasive that it
would not strain credulity to say the Court can take judicial
notice that baseball is everybody’s business. To put it mildly and
with restraint, it would be unfortunate indeed if a fine sport and
profession, which brings surcease from daily travail and an
escape from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this land, were
to suffer in the least because of undue concentration by any one
arguing that the first draft listed Robinson, Paige, and Campanella).
After the opinion was published, Blackmun apparently was asked why he omitted Mel Ott,
the great right fielder for the New York Giants. Blackmun is said to have insisted that he had
included Ott. When the clerk showed him that Ott’s name was not in the printed opinion,
Blackmun reportedly stated that he “would never forgive himself.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG,
supra, at 192.
96. Flood, 407 U.S. at 263-64 & nn.4-5.
97. Id. at 264.
98. Id. at 266-67.
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or any group on commercial and profit considerations. The game
is on higher ground; it behooves every one to keep it there.99
There was no discernible need for the Supreme Court to discuss, let
alone quote from, the lower court’s opinion denying Curtis Flood a
preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court did so because the lower
court’s observations advanced its unique national institution
narrative and helped connect the dots in its own interpretive
analysis.
Having thus employed both a sentimental history and the lower
court’s opinion to establish that baseball is a revered national icon,
Part IV of the Supreme Court’s opinion moved into a specific
argument about the reserve clause and Congress’s intent regarding
the Sherman Act’s relationship to that clause. In the course of this
discussion, the Court quoted from a 1952 report issued by the
Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, which affirmed “baseball’s need for some sort of
reserve clause” because “[b]aseball’s history shows that chaotic con-
ditions prevailed when there was no reserve clause” and because
“[e]xperience points to no feasible substitute to protect the integrity
of the game or to guarantee a comparatively even competitive
struggle.”100 Unsurprisingly, the Court concluded that although
other professional sports including football, boxing, and basketball
were required to comply with the federal antitrust laws, baseball’s
reserve system was exempt from them.101
Caveat: I do not mean to suggest that the unique national
institution canon did all of the interpretive work in Flood v. Kuhn.
To be sure, the Flood opinion, like the opinion in Holy Trinity, relied
on several traditional interpretive tools other than the baseball-as-
national-icon narrative to reach its conclusion. Chief among those
other tools were (1) two prior Supreme Court opinions, Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs102 and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,103 which
99. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added).
100. Flood, 407 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-2002, at 229 (1952)) (emphasis
added).
101. Id. at 282-83.
102. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
103. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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interpreted the federal antitrust laws to exempt baseball’s reserve
clause, and (2) the fact that Congress had been well aware of the
Court’s interpretation in Federal Baseball and Toolson for fifty
years, but had not acted to bring baseball’s reserve system within
the antitrust statutes.104 In fact, it is these other interpretive
canons—dubbed statutory stare decisis and legislative inaction,
respectively—for which Flood is best known in statutory inter-
pretation circles.105 My point in this Article is not to suggest that
statutory interpretation scholars have been wrong to focus on
statutory stare decisis and legislative inaction when analyzing
Flood; it is merely to show that the conventional reading of Flood,
like the conventional reading of Holy Trinity, misses something
important. That something is the recognition that whatever other
canons the Court may have relied on in Flood and Holy Trinity, it
also developed substantive background norms—using narratives
about the unique national status of baseball and Christianity—and
wielded those norms as conclusive evidence of congressional intent
to exempt certain privileged national icons from the relevant
statutes’ reach. 
Moreover, Federal Baseball and Toolson at least arguably were
ripe for overruling in Flood, given the Court’s established treatment
of the antitrust laws as common law statutes subject to judicial
updating106 and intervening cases refusing to exempt football,
boxing, and golf from the Sherman Act’s reach.107 If the Court had
not viewed baseball as such a unique and important national
institution, in danger of destruction if subjected to the antitrust
laws, it might well have taken the opportunity in Flood to declare
Federal Baseball and Toolson outdated and to bring baseball within
the Sherman Act’s reach.
104. Flood, 407 U.S. at 280-82.
105. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 640-42 (4th ed.
2007).
106. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(“Congress, however, did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning
of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The legislative history makes it
perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by
drawing on common-law tradition.”).
107. See Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); Radovich v.
Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Deesen v. Prof’l Golfers’ Ass’n of Am., 358 F.2d
165 (9th Cir. 1966).
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Such speculations aside, one need look no further than the
concluding section of the Flood majority opinion for proof that the
baseball narrative played a significant role in the Court’s determi-
nation that the Sherman Act did not apply to baseball. Points 2 and
3 in the Court’s summary of its reasoning acknowledged that its
ruling, together with the Federal Baseball and Toolson precedents,
created “an aberration confined to baseball,”108 but defended that
aberration, in part, because “[i]t rests on a recognition and an
acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs.”109
Moreover, Blackmun’s belief that “if the antitrust laws were applied
to baseball, its unique position as the national pastime would be
undermined” is well known.110
Finally, it bears noting that Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion
made a point of stating that “Americans love baseball as they love
all sports.”111 This comment hardly was critical to the dissent’s
reasoning, but it is interesting, if not telling, that the dissent sought
subtly to challenge the majority’s baseball-as-national-icon claim.
In fact, the next sentence of Justice Marshall’s dissent not-so-subtly
chided the majority for allowing its fondness for the game to
interfere with its construction of the statute, noting that “[p]erhaps
we become so enamored of athletics that we assume that they are
foremost in the minds of legislators as well as fans.”112 The dissent’s
reprimand elucidates the work that the unique national institution
canon does in the case; the dissent chastises the Court for inappro-
priately allowing baseball’s place in American society to serve as
definitive evidence of congressional intent.
So, the Court’s use of the baseball-nation narrative in Flood fol-
lowed much the same pattern as did its use of the Christian-nation
narrative in Holy Trinity:
1. The antitrust laws are general and clearly would cover
baseball’s reserve clause if straightforwardly applied.
2. However, baseball is the national pastime and enjoys a
unique place in American society, as a result of which this
Court twice has ruled it exempt from the antitrust laws
108. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
109. Id.
110. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 95, at 190.
111. Flood, 407 U.S. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
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and Congress has abided by this interpretation for fifty
years.113
3. Therefore, it is unthinkable that Congress ever intended
the antitrust laws to cover baseball’s reserve clause, and
we must continue to read those generally-applicable laws
to exempt this one special sport.
B. Leo Sheep v. United States
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Leo Sheep114 similarly used
sweeping historical narrative to justify an exception from statutory
coverage for a unique national institution—this time, for railroads.
Written by Justice Rehnquist, the opinion opened with a comment
that barely concealed its author’s zeal for its subject matter: “This
is one of those rare cases evoking episodes in this country’s history”
that ought to be remembered “as adventure.”115 As in Flood, the
Court’s opinion then succinctly set forth the statutory question at
issue: whether the Government has an implied easement to build a
road across land that originally was granted to the Union Pacific
Railroad (and subsequently sold to Leo Sheep) under the Union
Pacific Act of 1862.116 That question, the Court explained, “is posed
against the backdrop of a fascinating chapter in our history”117 and
“courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the
history of the times when it was passed.”118
As it did in Holy Trinity and Flood, the Court then provided a
detailed history of the American West and the crucial role that
railroads played in settling it. Exhibit 1 in that history lesson was
the acquisition of the territory that became the American West,
through the Louisiana and Gadsden Purchases in 1803 and 1853.119
Exhibit 2 was that that territory remained unsettled for decades,
with many pre-1850 maps referring to the area west of the Missouri
River as the “Great American Desert.”120 And Exhibit 3 was that as
113. See supra notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
114. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
115. Id. at 669.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875)).
119. Id. at 670.
120. Id.
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of 1860, the entire population of the State of Nebraska was less than
30,000 persons.121
Having thus established the unsettled state of the West as of
1860, the Court then described the nation’s historic need for
railroads to connect the eastern states to the West. The Court first
explained that the building of the railroad was animated by “the
desire of the Federal Government that the West be settled.”122 That
desire grew with the discovery of gold in California in 1848, as
“[t]hose in the East with visions of instant wealth ... confronted the
unenviable choice among an arduous 4-month overland trek, risking
yellow fever on a 35-day voyage via the Isthmus of Panama, and a
better than 4-month voyage around Cape Horn” (Exhibit 4),123 and
it intensified in the heat of the Civil War, when a logistical link with
California became necessary (Exhibit 5).124 But, the Court noted,
“private investors would not move without tangible governmental
inducement” (Exhibit 6).125 Providing that governmental inducement
proved difficult, because the direct governmental subsidy of a
transcontinental railroad fell within a constitutional gray area, as
Andrew Jackson had shown in 1830 when he vetoed a bill funding
construction of a road from Maysville to Lexington, Kentucky
(Exhibit 7).126 A “checkerboard” land-grant scheme was suggested,
but did not get off the ground, according to the Court, until two Civil
War battles that “doubtless made some impression upon Congress
of the necessity for being able to transport readily men and mate-
rials into that area for military purposes.”127 The Court’s narrative
described these admittedly “minor” military engagements—known
as the Battle of Picacho Pass in Arizona and the Battle of Glorieta
Pass in the Rocky Mountains—in some detail (Exhibits 8 and 9).128
Finally, the Court quoted from comments made on the House floor
during the debate on the Union Pacific Act:
121. Id.
122. Id. at 671.
123. Id. at 670.
124. Id. at 671.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 672. The issue was whether the funding of “internal improvements” such as
railroads was within Congress’s enumerated constitutional powers. Id.
127. Id. at 674.
128. Id. at 674-75.
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If this Union is to be preserved, if we are successfully to combat
the difficulties around us, if we are to crush out this rebellion
against the lawful authority of the Government, and are to have
an entire restoration, it becomes us, with statesmanlike pru-
dence and sagacity, to look carefully into the future, and to
guard in advance against all possible considerations which may
threaten the dismemberment of the country hereafter.129
(Exhibit 10). In short, the Court concluded that Congress enacted
the statute, at least in part, because it believed transcontinental
railroads were necessary to save the Union.130
This judicial history lesson occupied a full eight pages of text and,
as in Flood, garnered its own separate part.131 The subtext, or
bottom line, of the lesson was that we needed a railroad to unify our
scattered, vast nation. And we needed the Union Pacific Act and its
checkerboard land-grant scheme to achieve this national imperative.
As the history lesson illustrated, the checkerboard scheme allowed
the government to donate alternate sections of land adjacent to the
tracks to the railroads, while reserving the other half for sale.132 The
idea was that the development of the railroad would cause the price
of the reserved sections to double, so that the government would
recover from the reserved sections the price of the land it had given
away;133 with the cost of the land grants thus neutralized, the
government could be said not to have subsidized the railroads, and
the constitutional gray area could be avoided.
After thus painting the development of the Union Pacific Railroad
and the checkerboard land-grant scheme as the solution to a
nineteenth-century national dilemma, the Court then stated that
“[t]his case is the modern legacy of these early grants.”134 Quoting
from its own prior case law, the Court declared that “the intent of
Congress in making the Union Pacific grants was clear: ‘It was to
aid in the construction of the [rail]road by a gift of lands along its
route, without reservation of rights, except such as were specifically
129. Id. at 675-76 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1703 (1862) (statement of
Rep. Edwards)).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 670-77.
132. Id. at 673.
133. Id. (citing P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 345-46 (1968)).
134. Id. at 677.
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mentioned.’”135 In other words, the history showed that Congress’s
intent was to give private investors whatever land rights it took,
within constitutional limits, to ensure that the railroads would be
built. Given this intent, the Court simply could not imagine that
Congress meant implicitly to reserve an easement for the govern-
ment across the railroad’s lands. This was especially so, the Court
explained, because Congress did make a few express reservations
for homestead lands and mineral lands; where the Act is silent, the
history accordingly dictated that the default should favor the
railroads.136
As in Flood, I do not mean to suggest that the unique national
institution exception was the only interpretive tool upon which the
Leo Sheep Court relied. The Court also quoted from two prior
Supreme Court cases supporting a construction favoring the
railroads and placed significant emphasis on the common law137
doctrine of easements by necessity and its inapplicability given the
government’s power of eminent domain.138 My point in this Article
is not to undermine the interpretive role played by these other
tools of statutory construction, but merely to highlight the over-
looked role that the unique national institution canon played in the
Court’s interpretation. The Court’s history lesson in how-the-
railroads-settled-the-American-West was more than just a fanciful
detour taken by an overenthusiastic author of a majority opinion; it
was a powerful interpretive tool used to establish Congress’s intent
regarding the reservation of government rights against the railroad.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the role that the unique
national institution exception played in the Court’s decision sur-
faced in the course of the Court’s refusal to apply a classic, tried-
and-true substantive canon in the opposite direction. As the Court
explained:
The Government would have us decide this case on the basis of
the familiar canon of construction that, when grants to federal
135. Id. at 679 (quoting Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Kan. Pac. R.R. Co., 97 U.S. 491, 497
(1878)).
136. See id. at 678-79.
137. Id. at 682-83 (quoting Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625
(1885); United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 150 U.S. 1, 14 (1893)).
138. Id. at 679-80.
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lands are at issue, any doubts “are resolved for the Government,
not against it.” But this Court long ago declined to apply this
canon in its full vigor to grants under the railroad Acts.139
In other words, land grants to the railroads were unique. The Court
acknowledged that public grants generally are to be “construed
strictly against the grantees [that is, the railroads],” but insisted
that such grants “are not to be so construed as to defeat the intent
of the legislature.”140 And Congress’s intent with respect to the
railroad financiers, given the historical imperative to build a rail-
road, was solicitous. Thus, the Court noted that although “[i]t is
possible that Congress gave the problem [of governmental access
through railroad lands] little thought,” it was “at least as likely”
that Congress considered the issue but decided that “negotiation,
reciprocity considerations, and the power of eminent domain” were
better avenues for securing such access than limiting the bundle of
property rights conveyed to the railroads.141
Further, the Court, quoting a prior case involving the railroad
land grants, observed that when a statute passed by Congress:
[O]ffers to individuals or to corporations [ ] an inducement to
undertake and accomplish great and expensive enterprises or
works of a quasi public character in or through an immense and
undeveloped public domain, such legislation stands upon a
somewhat different footing from merely a private grant, and
should receive at the hands of the court a more liberal construc-
tion in favor of the purposes for which it was enacted.142
Translation: A special background rule applies in light of the role
that railroad land grants played in the settlement of the American
West. Indeed, the Court effectively created a reverse background
presumption in favor of the railroads: unless a right expressly is
reserved against the railroad on the face of the land-granting
statute, the statute must be construed to favor the railroad. This
formulation, like the Christian-nation argument in Holy Trinity,
shares much in common with modern-day clear statement rules,
139. Id. at 682 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 682-83 (quoting Denver & Rio Grande, 150 U.S. at 14).
141. Id. at 681.
142. Id. at 682-83 (quoting Denver & Rio Grande, 150 U.S. at 14).
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which require an explicit declaration in the statutory text in order
to contravene certain background constitutional norms.143 Moreover,
it follows the three-step pattern set by the Christian-nation nar-
rative in Holy Trinity and the baseball narrative in Flood:
1. The statute at issue clearly would imply an easement in
favor of the government and against the railroad (and its
successor) under ordinary, generally-applicable principles
of statutory construction.
2. However, railroads are a unique national institution;
they were the solution to a national crisis in the nine-
teenth century, and it took substantial government
inducement to get private parties to build them.144
3. Therefore, it is unthinkable that Congress could have
meant quietly to limit the rights it conveyed to the rail-
roads and we must except this unique national institution
from the general rule of implied governmental reserva-
tions that would apply to other private land grantees.
Thus, the Court once again used the unique national institution
canon as an interpretive tool through which to carve out a statutory
exception for a particular privileged entity. Railroads, like baseball
and Christian churches, were painted as national icons, upon which
Congress could not have intended to impose the statutory burdens
that applied to other land grantees, sports, or employers.
C. FDA v. Brown & Williamson
The statutory question at issue in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.145 was whether the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act146 (FDCA) authorized the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
to regulate tobacco products. One of the main arguments presented
by the tobacco companies was that if the Act did authorize the FDA
to regulate tobacco, then it also would require the agency to ban
tobacco products, given the FDA’s findings that such products were
dangerous and unsafe.147 Although the statutory text clearly gave
143. See discussion supra note 50 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
145. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
146. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1994).
147. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents Philip Morris Inc. & Lorillard Tobacco Co. at 40-41,
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the FDA authority to regulate “drugs” and “devices,”148 the Court
agreed with the tobacco companies’ construction and concluded that
Congress could not have intended, in enacting the FDCA, to give the
FDA authority to regulate, and in effect ban, tobacco products.149
As in Holy Trinity, Flood, and Leo Sheep, the Supreme Court in
Brown & Williamson relied significantly on tobacco’s unique place
in American life and its centrality to the American economy to
reach this interpretation. Unlike in those earlier cases, however, the
Court in Brown & Williamson did not offer a detailed narrative
about tobacco’s unique national status. The opinion for the Court
contained no romanticization of tobacco, no lengthy homage to
tobacco’s place in our nation’s history. Rather, the Court simply
alluded, in a few disjointed places, to tobacco’s role in the American
economy and in American society. In Part II.A, for example, the
Court matter-of-factly noted that a provision of the U.S. Code
declares that “the marketing of tobacco constitutes one of the
greatest basic industries of the United States with ramifying
activities which directly affect interstate and foreign commerce at
every point, and stable conditions therein are necessary to the
general welfare.”150 (Exhibit 1). Several pages later, in Part II.B, the
Court quoted statements made by Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) Secretary Anthony Celebrezze during congres-
sional hearings held in 1965, urging Congress not to amend the
FDCA to cover “‘smoking products’” because “such a ‘provision might
well completely outlaw at least cigarettes,’” and “‘[t]his would be
contrary to what, we understand, is intended or what, in the light of
our experience with the 18th amendment, would be acceptable to the
American people.’”151 (Exhibit 2).
That was the sum total of the Court’s explicit references to
tobacco’s unique status in American society. But although the
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (No. 98-1152); Brief for
Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. at 24-26, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) (No. 98-1152) [hereinafter R.J. Reynolds Brief].
148. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)-(h), 393 (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
149. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 142.
150. Id. at 137 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))
(emphasis added).
151. 529 U.S. at 145-46 (quoting Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings Before the
H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong. 18 (1964) (statement of Anthony
Celebrezze, Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) (emphasis added)).
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Court’s opinion did not dwell on it, the tobacco-as-unique-national-
institution narrative very much was lurking in the background of
the case. The brief for the United States Tobacco Company, for
example, reminded the Court of tobacco’s vaunted pedigree upfront,
noting that: “Smokeless tobacco has a long history. The Copenhagen
brand of moist snuff has existed since 1822. The ‘Garrett’ trade-
mark, used for moist and dry snuff products, is the oldest trademark
in continuous use in the United States.”152 (Background Record
Exhibit 1). The brief for the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
similarly emphasized tobacco’s central role in the American
economy, explaining that: “Since early in this century, tobacco
products have been commonly used, and tobacco and tobacco
products have constituted a major sector of the U.S. economy.”153
(Background Record Exhibit 2). The R.J. Reynolds Brief later circled
back and specifically tied tobacco’s economic significance to Con-
gress’s intent, arguing that 
A tobacco ban would be contrary to Congress’s intent in enacting
the FDCA. In view of the significant place of tobacco products in
American life in 1938, widespread concerns about their safety,
and the then recent end of alcohol prohibition in 1933, a ban on
tobacco products was not reasonably within the contemplation of
the enacting Congress.154
Finally, the Fourth Circuit opinion in the case highlighted legisla-
tors’ sympathies towards tobacco farmers, quoting the following
comment made during floor debate on amendments to the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act:155
[I]t is my feeling that not one of the tobacco farmers in my
district would knowingly produce any commodity which, when
consumed, would cause the dread diseases which have been
claimed to be associated with tobacco. But the claims ... are not
proved. Tobacco has been impeached in passion but it had not
152. R.J. Reynolds Brief, supra note 147, at 3.
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 32.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1970).
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been convicted in fact. Facts, cold hard facts are the basis upon
which congress should legislate.156
(Background Record Exhibit 3). 
The Court had all of this evidence of tobacco’s unique status
before it while it reviewed the case and decided how to interpret the
statute. And although the Court did not choose to devote several
pages of text to eulogizing tobacco’s role in American history, it was
rather candid about the impact that this history had on its ulti-
mate construction of the statute. Indeed, after noting the lack of
textual evidence or legislative history indicating that the enacting
Congress even contemplated that the FDCA might apply to tobacco
products, the Court explicitly deferred to tobacco’s historic status in
American life, concluding that “[g]iven the economic and political
significance of the tobacco industry at the time, it is extremely
unlikely that Congress could have intended to place tobacco within
the ambit of the FDCA absent any discussion of the matter.”157
Moreover, towards the end of its opinion, the Court again referred
to tobacco’s special national status to explain its construction that
the FDCA does not cover tobacco products: “Owing to its unique
place in American history and society, tobacco has its own unique
political history. Congress, for better or for worse, has created a
distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products.”158
Thus, despite its lack of lyricism or detailed exegesis on tobacco’s
history, the Court very much relied on a background narrative
about tobacco’s national status to interpret the relevant statute.
As in Holy Trinity, Flood, and Leo Sheep, it established—albeit in
truncated fashion—a background presumption that tobacco is a
“unique” national commodity deserving of special treatment and
used that presumption as conclusive evidence of congressional
intent to exempt tobacco from the reach of an otherwise clear
statutory text (or, in the case of Leo Sheep, from the application of
156. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 180 (4th Cir. 1998) (Hall,
J., dissenting) (quoting Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 16 (1969) (comments of Rep. Carl Perkins,
Chairman, Comm. on Education and Labor)).
157. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
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an otherwise controlling interpretive canon). Once again, the Court’s
analysis followed the familiar pattern inaugurated in Holy Trinity:
1. The statute at issue is generally-worded and clearly would
empower the FDA to regulate tobacco products if straight-
forwardly applied.
2. However, tobacco is a unique national commodity with a
critical role in the American economy and a long history of
recreational use in American society.159
3. Therefore, it is unthinkable that Congress could have
meant for the statute to authorize the FDA to regulate, let
alone ban, tobacco products, and we must read the statute
to except this unique national commodity.
And again, as in Holy Trinity, Flood, and Leo Sheep, the Court’s
formulation approximated a clear statement rule: “[g]iven the
economic and political significance of the tobacco industry at the
time, it is extremely unlikely that Congress could have intended to
place tobacco within the ambit of the FDCA absent any discussion
of the matter.”160 In other words, unless Congress expressly indicates
otherwise, we will not interpret a statute to give a mere agency power
over such an important national commodity.
But the background presence of the tobacco narrative aside, it
bears asking: why was there no lengthy homage to tobacco in this
opinion? One possible answer is that the Court saw no need to pay
extended tribute to tobacco because it is common knowledge that
tobacco farming played a prominent role in our nation’s history.
Every schoolchild learns that tobacco was the cash crop of the first
Virginia colonies and that many of the founding fathers were
tobacco growers. It is no accident, after all, that tobacco leaves grace
the tops of the pillars on nearly all federal buildings in Washington,
D.C., including the Supreme Court.161 But the problem with this
explanation is that it arguably also is true that the nation’s
Christian roots were common knowledge when Holy Trinity was
decided, and that baseball’s status as the national pastime was
obvious when Flood was written, yet that did not stop the Court
159. See supra notes 150-53, 156 and accompanying text.
160. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
161. Ronald J. Rychlak, Cards and Dice in Smoky Rooms: Tobacco Bans and Modern
Casinos, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 467, 472 n.27 (2009).
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from cataloguing the country’s Christian heritage or providing a
sentimental history of baseball in those cases. 
The real reason, I think, for the Court’s reluctance to wax lyrical
about tobacco in Brown & Williamson is that by the time the case
was decided in 2000, the serious health hazards associated with
tobacco use had become well known and tobacco’s place in our
national history had become somewhat of an embarrassment—at
least to Justice O’Connor, who authored the majority opinion. Thus,
the opinion for the Court stated that “for better or for worse,”162
Congress had chosen to give tobacco special treatment. The subtext:
we, the Court, need not applaud tobacco’s privileged status through
a detailed history lesson, but merely will acknowledge it and
interpret the statute in accordance with that background norm—
that is, interpret the FDCA to leave tobacco regulation up to
Congress and to deny the FDA authority to regulate tobacco.
As in Flood and Leo Sheep, there were, of course, other interpre-
tive tools at work in Brown & Williamson besides the lurking
unique national institution canon. The opinion for the Court also
relied, for example, on the fact that during the first seventy-three
years of the FDCA’s operation, the FDA repeatedly insisted that it
was not authorized to regulate tobacco products.163 Moreover, the
Court placed substantial weight on the existence of six federal
statutes specifically regulating tobacco sales and advertising,
reasoning that if the FDA actually possessed the authority to
regulate tobacco products, then Congress would not have stepped in
and regulated tobacco itself.164 Along these same lines, the Court
noted that, over the years, Congress had considered and rejected a
number of bills that expressly would have given the FDA authority
to regulate tobacco products.165 As in the earlier cases, the Court’s
reliance on these other interpretive tools has been much discussed
in the commentary on Brown & Williamson and forms part of the
conventional understanding of the case.166 By emphasizing the
162. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
163. Id. at 125, 144-46, 155-58.
164. Id. at 143-56.
165. Id. at 147-48.
166. See, e.g., Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 297, 322 (2004); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Policymaking,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 386 & n.58 (2002); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and
the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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background influence that the tobacco narrative exerted on the
Court’s opinion, this Article does not mean to undermine the
interpretive work performed by these other tools of construction, but
only to make the conventional understanding of the case more
complete.
D. Morton v. Mancari
Morton v. Mancari167 is an intricate case involving the intersec-
tion of Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision, as amended in
1972,168 with a statutory preference for Indian employees at the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) contained in the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act.169 The case was initiated by non-Indian
employees at the BIA170 who argued that the Bureau’s practice of
giving preferences to Indian employees violated Title VII’s require-
ment that personnel actions “be made free from any discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”171 The BIA
countered that Title VII was enacted against a historical and
statutory backdrop that recognized the unique status of Indian
tribes and of Indian self-governance, and authorized an employment
preference for Indians as a means to that end.172 It argued that
Congress could not have intended, in enacting Title VII, to undo the
long-standing Indian employment preference.173 The Supreme Court
agreed, holding, inter alia, that absent a clear statement in the text
of Title VII indicating Congress’s intent to repeal the employment
941, 1009-10 (2000).
167. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
168. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. II
1973). The original, unamended version of Title VII enacted as part of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act applied only to private employers and contained an express exemption for preferential
employment of Indians by Indian tribes or by industries located on or near Indian
reservations. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(i) (1964). When
Congress amended the statute in 1972 to extend its coverage to federal government
employers, it failed to enact a similar express exemption for preferential Indian employment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. II 1973).
169. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1934).
170. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 539.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. II 1973).
172. Brief of Appellants at 7-20, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (No. 73-362) (citing
treaties).
173. Id. at 27-29.
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preferences for Indians, the statute must be read to contain an
exception for Indian preferences.174
As in the other cases discussed in this Part, the Mancari Court
relied significantly on the unique historical status of Native
Americans and tribal reservations to arrive at this interpretation of
Title VII. But as with its treatment of tobacco in Brown & William-
son, the Court’s execution of the Native-Americans-as-unique-
national-entities argument was minimalist in Mancari. The opinion
for the Court contained no detailed historical exegesis of the
complicated relationship between the United States government
and Native Americans, no apologetic chronicling of the manner in
which Indian lands were taken by American settlers. Rather, the
opinion subtly alluded to that history as the backdrop against which
federal employment preferences for Indians were created and in
light of which congressional intent towards the rights of Indians
living on reservations should be measured. Thus, rather than
recount the wars and treaties that produced the Indian reserva-
tions, the Court’s opinion took that history as understood, and
instead emphasized the unique treatment of Native American
employees. 
Part II of the opinion, for example, began by noting that the
practice of according “hiring preference[s] to Indians in the Indian
service dates at least as far back as 1834,” when a preference was
given “‘to persons of Indian descent’” to serve as interpreters “‘for
the benefit of the Indians’” (Exhibit 1).175 The opinion went on to cite
additional statutes conferring preferences to Indians for employ-
ment as “clerical, mechanical, and other help on reservations and
about agencies” (Exhibit 2);176 as “herders, teamsters, and laborers
‘and where practicable in all other employments’ in the Indian
service” (Exhibit 3);177 as “matrons, farmers, and industrial teachers
in Indian schools” (Exhibit 4);178 and creating a “general preference
[for] Indian labor and products of Indian industry” (Exhibit 5).179
174. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 547-49.
175. Id. at 541 & n.7 (citing Act of June 30, 1834, § 9, 4 Stat. 737, 25 U.S.C. § 45).
176. Id. at n.8 (citing Act of May 17, 1882, § 6, 22 Stat. 88 and Act of July 4, 1884, § 6, 23
Stat. 97, 25 U.S.C. § 46).
177. Id. (citing Act of Aug. 15, 1894, § 10, 28 Stat. 313, 25 U.S.C. § 44).
178. Id. (citing Act of June 7, 1897, § 1, 30 Stat. 83, 25 U.S.C. § 274).
179. Id. (citing Act of June 25, 1910, § 23, 36 Stat. 861, 25 U.S.C. § 47).
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The Court then alluded to the special status of Native Americans,
explaining that the purpose of the Indian preferences was “to
further the Government’s trust obligation toward the Indian tribes,”
and “to give Indians a greater participation in their own self-
government” (Exhibit 6).180 And the Court quoted from a letter
reprinted in the House Report to the 1934 Indian Reorganization
Act, from President Franklin Roosevelt to Congress, calling federal
encouragement of Indian self-governance “‘the obligation of honor of
a powerful nation toward a people living among us and dependent
upon our protection’” (Exhibit 7).181 The Court similarly quoted from
a lengthy floor statement by the House sponsor of the 1934 Act,
discussing the importance of Indian self-governance and the need
for Indian employment preferences to achieve it (Exhibit 8).182
Finally, the Court cited data indicating that the Indian preferences
were working—that the percentage of Indians employed in the
Bureau rose from 34 percent in 1934 to 57 percent in 1972 as a
result of the preferences (Exhibit 9).183
The message underlying these historical references was that the
Indian tribes have a special trust relationship with the United
States government and that preferential treatment for Indian
employees in jobs dealing with Indian governance under the BIA
was part of the government’s longstanding approach to fulfilling its
duties towards the Indian tribes. Thus, after laying out its historical
case, the Court made the familiar unique national institution
argument that absent “some affirmative showing” of congressional
intent to repeal the Indian preference, Title VII’s otherwise clear
text must be read to except employment decisions that promote
Indian self-governance.184 In the Court’s words, “[a]ny other
conclusion can be reached only by formalistic reasoning that ignores
both the history and purposes of the preference and the unique legal
relationship between the Federal Government and tribal Indians.”185
Against this backdrop, the Court “simply cannot conclude”186 that
180. Id. at 541-42 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 542 n.10 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1804, at 8 (1934)) (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 543-44 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 11729 (1934) (statement of Rep. Howard)).
183. Id. at 545.
184. Id. at 550.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 551.
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Congress could have intended to undo the Indian preferences when
it extended Title VII’s antidiscrimination provisions to federal
employers in 1972—even though Congress did not expressly exempt
the Indian preferences from the amendment’s reach.187 In fact, as in
Holy Trinity, Flood, Leo Sheep, and Brown & Williamson, the
Mancari Court created the equivalent of a reverse clear statement
rule: absent clear language on the face of a statute indicating
otherwise, we will assume that Congress intends to maintain all
historical preferences for Indian employees. 
Because Mancari involved a face-off between the statutory prefer-
ence for Indian employees contained in the Indian Reorganization
Act and the antidiscrimination provision in amended Title VII, the
Court’s opinion also relied heavily on the canon against implied
repeals of existing statutes in construing the scope of Title VII.188 In
fact, it is this interpretive canon for which Mancari is best known.189
Nevertheless, it seems quite likely that the Court would have
construed Title VII the same way, based on the unique status of
Native American tribes, even without the canon against implied
repeals—that is, even if the Indian preferences had been part of
longstanding federal practice but never had been codified.
Any doubts about the work performed by the unique national
institution canon in Mancari should be resolved when one considers
two things. First, the original version of Title VII enacted as part of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination by
private employers, did contain an explicit exemption for preferential
treatment towards Indians “on or near an Indian reservation.”190
Thus, the fact that Congress did not include an express exemption
for Indian employment preferences when it extended Title VII to
federal employers was significant and created the kind of linguistic
discrepancy that courts often take as strong evidence of congres-
sional intent not to exempt Indian preferences in the second situ-
ation.191 Accordingly, the Court must have relied on some back
187. See supra note 165.
188. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551.
189. See, e.g., Carlos E. González, Trumps, Inversions, Balancing, Presumptions, Institution
Prompting, and Interpretive Canons: New Ways for Adjudicating Conflicts Between Legal
Norms, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 233, 305 n.156 (2005) (calling Mancari the “most cited federal
case for the presumption against implied repeals”).
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(i) (1964).
191. The expressio unius canon suggests that the express inclusion of a thing (the Indian
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ground norm to tip the scales in favor of finding a congressional
intent not to apply Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision to Indian
employment preferences. If that background norm were as simple
as the canon against implied repeals, then why the detailed
references in Part II to the history and purpose of Indian preference
statutes, including several statutes besides the allegedly repealed
statute at issue? Second, the unique status of Native Americans
very clearly was on the Court’s mind when it decided the case.
Indeed, the second half of the opinion, which addressed the
constitutionality of the Indian preference, directly discussed the
broad history behind Native American reservations and the United
States’ special relationship with the tribes who live on them:
In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States
overcame the Indians and took possession of their lands,
sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated, helpless and
dependent people, needing protection against the selfishness of
others and their own improvidence. Of necessity, the United
States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with
it the authority to do all that was required to perform that
obligation and to prepare the Indians to take their place as
independent, qualified members of the modern body politic.192
(Exhibit 10). Although the Court did not reference this history until
the constitutional section of its opinion, the history—like the jury
bell that cannot be unrung—obviously formed part of the back-
ground against which the Court conducted its statutory construc-
tion.
The Court’s use of the unique national institution canon in
Morton v. Mancari once again followed the familiar three-step
pattern: 
1. The statute at issue is general and clearly would invali-
date Indian employment preferences if straightforwardly
applied.
preference) in one part of the statute implies its deliberate exclusion under another part of
the statute (the amendment) that contains no similar exclusion. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY &
GARRETT, supra note 105, at 1088 (making this point regarding Mancari).
192. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552.
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2. However, Indian tribes have a unique status vis-à-vis the
United States government, and the United States long has
provided special preferences for Indian employees.193
3. Therefore, it is unthinkable that Congress could have
intended for the statute to invalidate Indian employment
preferences, and we must read the statute to exempt this
unique national entity from the general rule.
***
The unique national institution canon, or at least the Supreme
Court’s articulation of it, thus seems to have two distinct parts:
A historical narrative/other
evidence/statement that X = A
Unique National Institution 
 + A conclusion that the statute
at issue cannot govern X,
because X = A Unique     
National Institution
The first part involves a sort of judicial notice-taking of American
history or tradition and can be lengthy, as in Holy Trinity, Flood,
and Leo Sheep or cursory, as in Brown & Williamson and Mancari.
The second part provides the interpretive work dictating how the
statute should be construed; it is the distilled version of the third
step of the syllogism outlined above for each of the cases. It can be
stated, in canon form, as follows: general statutes and rules of law
do not apply to unique national institutions unless Congress clearly
has indicated otherwise.
III. THE UNIQUE NATIONAL INSTITUTION CANON IN CONTEXT
Beyond the mechanics of how the unique national institutional
canon operates, the canon’s existence itself raises numerous and
significant theoretical questions. For example, what does it take for
an interpretive technique to qualify as a “canon” or “rule” of stat-
utory construction as opposed to a mere style of argument? Can the
unique national institution exception to general rules of law
legitimately be dubbed such a canon? Is the exception, in any event,
a good interpretive approach? This last Part addresses such defi-
193. See supra notes 175-83, 192 and accompanying text.
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nitional and normative concerns about the unique national institu-
tion exception’s status and value as an interpretive rule.
A. “Canons” Unpacked
The canons of statutory interpretation variously have been
described as rules of thumb, maxims, presumptions, or conventions
that courts use to determine the most likely meaning of statutory
text.194 But such definitions are unsatisfyingly self-referential.
Distilled to its core, canonical status seems to derive from an
interpretive technique’s claim to one or more of the following: (1)
frequent use by the Supreme Court; (2) longevity, in that the
technique originated in English courts or long has been listed in
Sutherland’s definitive treatise, Statutes and Statutory Construc-
tion;195 (3) grounding in some fundamental tenet of the American
legal system (such as, the Constitution); or (4) promoting consistent
judicial treatment of certain words or subject matters. The expressio
unius maxim, for example, gains its canonical status primarily
through longevity—it is a Latin maxim used often by the English
courts and is prominent in Sutherland’s treatise196—and also has
been used frequently by the Supreme Court.197 The Rule of Lenity
likewise derives authority from its longevity—Justice Scalia has
defended the canon on the grounds that it “is almost as old as the
common law itself ”198—and from its basis in the fundamental
constitutional due process principle that criminal laws should give
fair notice of the behavior that is outlawed.199 Interpretive tech-
niques with a shorter historical pedigree, such as the whole act and
whole code rules, have achieved canonical status because they
promote the consistent treatment of statutory words, phrases,
194. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 105, at 847-48; KENT GREENAWALT,
LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 201 (1999).
195. STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (Norman Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer
eds., 7th ed. 2007).
196. Id. at 398-438.
197. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigman Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 552-53 (2002).
198. Scalia, supra note 10, at 29.
199. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-04 (2005);
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39,
54 (1994); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988); see also ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY
& GARRETT, supra note 105, at 32 (categorizing the Rule of Lenity as a Due Process-based
substantive canon).
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sections, and subject matter. And one of the newest additions to the
arsenal of statutory interpretation canons, the federalism clear
statement rule, earned its stature through frequent Supreme Court
use coupled with a grounding in the fundamental constitutional
principle of federalism.200 
The basic thread connecting all of these canons is established
convention. Whether their authority derives from pedigree, frequent
use, constitutional grounding, or precedential weight, the inter-
pretive canons are treated as such because they are believed to
reflect rules or norms with which the legal community is familiar.
The “canons” are given special status, rather than treated as
ordinary legal argument styles or logical inferences, because they
are believed to reflect the background understandings against which
legislators draft statutory language, and against which judges,
lawyers, and those affected by a statute are meant to read that
language.201
So, what does all of this mean for the unique national institution
exception to general rules of law? Is it a “canon” or “rule” of stat-
utory interpretation, as this Article has argued, or merely an
argumentative technique which the Supreme Court has used on a
few occasions to avoid the plain meaning of a statute’s text? There
is no evidence thus far that the exception was used by English
courts, and it has not been listed in Sutherland’s treatise, so the
longevity rationale does not seem to apply. Nor is there any in-
dication that the exception has been used frequently by the
Supreme Court; there may be instances other than those docu-
mented in this Article in which the Court excepted a revered
national institution from a general rule of law, but thus far at least,
there is no indication that it has done so frequently. Neither is the
exception based on any fundamental constitutional tenet, although
it does derive from basic public norms. The exception does, however,
seem to fit the last criteria for canonical status, in that it seeks to
200. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737-40 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion); Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140-41 (2004); BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-64 (1991); see also
ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 105, at 32 app. B (categorizing federalism clear
statement rules as Constitution-based substantive canons).
201. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 105, at 48; William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66-69 (1994).
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promote consistent legal and judicial treatment of special national
entities. Like other recognized canons of statutory interpretation,
the unique national institution exception derives its authority from
established conventions—sometimes proved through a historical
narrative and exhibits—about how particular American icons are to
be treated by the government and in the law. Moreover, the Court
relies on the unique national institution exception for the same
reason that it relies on other canons of statutory construction—
because it believes that the exception captures the background
understandings and norms which Congress takes into account when
drafting all statutes. 
In this sense, the unique national institution exception is much
more than just a style of argument or an argumentative technique.
It is more than just a way of arguing that the statute’s plain
language cannot be followed because Congress did not intend or
anticipate this particular result from this particular statute. Indeed,
purpose-based and legislative history-based arguments could
achieve that much on their own. What the unique national institu-
tion exception provides is a larger, more expansive rule dictating
that broad, general statutes presumptively should not be applied in
a manner that burdens certain special American icons. It is based
not on Congress’s intent with respect to the particular statute at
hand, but on overarching legal and public norms in the shadow of
which Congress is presumed to legislate. The canon thus is some-
what like the “constitutional avoidance” canon, which dictates not
that the purpose of a particular statute is inconsistent with a
proposed interpretation or that the statute’s legislative history
precludes that interpretation, but rather that an interpretation
should be presumed incorrect (avoided) when it conflicts with the
established constitutional principles that form the backdrop against
which Congress drafts statutes. 
Some may question whether an interpretive technique, even if
based on established convention, can be considered a “canon” when
the Court has not labeled it as such in its opinions. That is, they
may resist the idea that there can be an “accidental” or “undeclared”
canon of statutory construction. Such criticism, however, ignores the
fact that the Court regularly employs canons of statutory constru-
ction without announcing that that is what it is doing. The Court
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routinely, for example, relies on the “dog that didn’t bark” canon,202
the expressio unius canon,203 and the whole act rule204 without
identifying the canon on which it is relying or even necessarily
indicating that the argument it is making is based on a canon.
In other words, the Court often simply sets forth its reasoning as
202. The canon is named after a famous Sherlock Holmes story, Silver Blaze, in which the
fact that a dog did not bark while a racehorse was being stolen led the detective to deduce that
the thief was someone the dog knew well. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE
MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 27 (Christopher Roden ed., 1993). The canon holds that where
the legislative history is silent, courts should not presume that Congress intended to work
drastic changes in a law, on the theory that if drastic changes were intended, some legislator
would have “barked” and highlighted the change somewhere in the legislative history. The
Supreme Court has employed this canon several times without naming it or even mentioning
the words “dog” or “bark.” See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81,
88 (2007) (relying on the fact that when the Federal Aid Impact Program statute was
amended in 1994, “no Member of Congress, no Department of Education official, no school
district or State” expressed the view that the amendment required the Secretary of Education
to change the Department’s long-standing system for calculating equalization of
expenditures); Scheidler v. N.O.W., 547 U.S. 9, 20 (2006) (refusing to presume that the 1946
revision to the Hobbs Act worked any change in the underlying substantive law absent clear
expression of a legislative intent to work such change).
203. See, e.g., Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 997 (2008) (rejecting the
claim that there is a public health exception to the preemption provision of the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act on the grounds that the Act explicitly lists several
other exceptions without mentioning public health); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 298 (2006) (noting that the lack of any reference to expert fees or of
any comparable provisions relating to the reasonableness of expert fees “strongly suggests
that recovery of expert fees is not authorized” under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act). For an explanation of how the expressio unius canon works, see supra note
191.
204. See, e.g., LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1025-26 (2008)
(rejecting argument that fiduciaries cannot be held liable for losses in an individual account
because, inter alia, one section of ERISA exempts fiduciaries from liability when losses are
caused by participants’ exercise of control over assets in their individual accounts and noting
that “[t]his provision would serve no real purpose if, as respondents argue, fiduciaries never
had any liability for losses in an individual account”); Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501,
507 (2007) (“We cannot accept the Hincks’ invitation to isolate one feature of this ‘precisely
drawn, detailed statute’—the portion specifying a standard of review—and use it to permit
taxpayers to circumvent the other limiting features Congress placed in the same
statute—restrictions such as a shorter statute of limitations than general refund suits, or a
net-worth ceiling for plaintiffs eligible to bring suit.” (citations omitted)); Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 735 (2006) (stating that wetlands abutting tributaries with intermittent
water flow are not “navigable waters” because, inter alia, “the CWA itself categorizes the
channels and conduits that typically carry intermittent flows of water separately from
‘navigable waters,’ by including them in the definition of ‘point source’” and by defining
“discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source” and, further, that these definitions “would make little sense” if there was significant
overlap between what constitutes “navigable waters” and what constitutes a “point source”). 
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to why a statute should be read a certain way, without locating
that reasoning in the chain of jurisprudential authority to which
it belongs or labeling that reasoning as an application of a par-
ticular interpretive rule. For example, in Scheidler v. National
Organization of Women, the Court relied on congressional silence to
argue that the 1946 revisions to the Hobbs Act did not work any
major changes in the law, without making any mention of dogs,
barking, or the Sherlock Holmes story from which the dog that
did not bark canon gets its name.205 And that is precisely what
the Court has done in the unique national institution cases—it
has created exceptions for five special national entities because
established conventions and practices so dictated, and it has done
so without labeling its reasoning and without tying its reasoning in
one case to its reasoning in prior cases. The Court’s failure explicitly
to identify the canon does not make the unique national institution
exception any less a canon of construction than the failure to
reference barking dogs or to label arguments based on legislative
silence as an interpretative rule renders the dog that did not bark
canon nonexistent. 
Assuming, then, that the unique national institution exception is
a legitimate canon of statutory construction, the question remains:
what kind of canon is it? Scholars have suggested that the canons
of statutory interpretation can be divided into three separate
categories: textual canons, reference canons, and substantive
canons.206 Textual canons are rules that seek to gauge the most
likely meaning of statutory language based on clues and inferences
found within the four corners of the statute—such as the structure,
grammar, punctuation, or relationship between words and phrases
in the statute’s text.207 Reference canons involve the use of outside
sources, extrinsic to the statutory text, as guides to statutory
meaning, including a statute’s legislative history, the common law,
other statutes with similar language or structure, and agency
205. Scheidler, 547 U.S. at 20.
206. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 105, at 848; GREENAWALT, supra
note 194, at 201. 
207. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 105, at 848; GREENAWALT, supra note
194, at 201-06; see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 49, at 12-13 (referring to textual
canons as “language canons”).
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interpretations of a statute.208 Substantive canons are policy-based
canons that create deliberate presumptions in favor of a particular
statutory interpretation based on background legal or normative
considerations.209
The unique national institution canon obviously cannot be
considered a textual canon because it directs courts to ignore the
text of the statute and to create an exception to the most natural
reading of that text. But further categorization is difficult, as the
canon shares features in common with both reference and substan-
tive canons. On the one hand, the unique national institution
exception’s appeal to common practice—that is, to how government
entities and the law have treated a special national entity thus
far—is rather like an appeal to the prototypical extrinsic source, the
common law. On the other hand, given that the exception relies on
public norms and national traditions, it bears a striking resem-
blance to substantive canons such as the avoidance canon, clear
statement rules, and the presumption against implying causes of
action into federal statutes.210 In my view, the primary difference
between the reference and the substantive canons seems to be
concreteness. Reference canons look to information—legislative
history, the common law, other statutes, and agency interpretations
—that is written down somewhere, in an authoritative extrinsic
source. Substantive canons, by contrast, rely on public policies and
background norms that are far more ethereal and that can seem to
spring forth, Athena-like, from judges’ heads211 to fill the spaces
between written laws, practices, and constitutions. In this sense, the
unique national institution exception, based as it is on judicial
articulation of experienced but unwritten, intangible American
traditions and values, has more in common with the loosey-goosey
substantive canons than it does with the more tangible reference
canons. 
208. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 105, at 848; GREENAWALT, supra note
194, at 171, 201, 233.
209. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 105, at 848; GREENAWALT, supra note
194, at 206-11; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 49, at 13.
210. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102-05 (1991); Thompson
v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).
211. See, e.g., EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 29 (1950) (describing Athena’s birth, full-
grown and in full armor, from Zeus’s head).
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B. Normative Considerations
The Court’s opinions in Holy Trinity, Flood, Leo Sheep, Brown &
Williamson, and Mancari have been criticized for going against the
text of the relevant statute, producing bad policy, and creating an
unfair exception for one entity.212 In employing the unique national
institution exception to decide these cases, the Court neither has
denied the countertextual nature of its construction nor has de-
fended the policy consequences produced by it. Instead, the Court’s
justification has been that its interpretation is most consistent with
Congress’s specific intent towards a particular litigant or implicated
entity, given that entity’s iconic national status. And, irrespective
of the substantive merits of the Court’s constructions, it is striking
that the Court does appear, in all five cases, accurately to have
gauged Congress’s specific intent towards the relevant regulated
entities. That is, the available alternative evidence indicates that
the enacting Congresses did not intend to outlaw the employment
practices of Christian churches, subject baseball’s reserve clause to
the antitrust laws, limit the land rights conveyed to railroads, give
the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products, or repeal the BIA’s
Indian employment preferences. 
212. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 105, at 981 (arguing that a
subsequent shift in statutory policy, favoring protection of the nation’s natural resources
rather than facilitation of private action, changed the landscape against which Leo Sheep
should have been decided); Robert C. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of
Professional Baseball’s Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 209, 210 & n.3
(1983) (criticizing the Supreme Court for “engag[ing] in overt policy-making for the benefit of
a single industry.... This special ‘exemption,’ based on an obvious sympathy for the maturing
‘national pastime,’ was starkly contrary to the prevailing antitrust law. It ignored the rights
and problems of the players, as well as of other potential competitors, in order to protect the
interests of the then-established owners. This was not only both bad law and a poor reflection
on the ideal of the ‘objective judiciary,’ but also arguably was bad policy in that it provided a
potent precedent for specialized, situational- and industry-specific applications of otherwise
general laws.” (citations omitted)); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents:
Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1762 (1997)
(criticizing the Mancari Court’s failure to appreciate the racial classification consequences of
upholding the Indian employment preference); C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial Reinterpretation
of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 HOUS. L. REV. 611, 620 (1977)
(criticizing Flood); Scalia, supra note 10, at 22; Richard A. Whiting et al., Professional Sports:
Has Antitrust Killed the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg?, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 290, 299 (1976)
(similarly criticizing Flood); Joseph G. White, Note, Prestidigitation and the Chevron Doctrine:
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 120 S. Ct. 1291
(2000), 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 285, 313 (2001) (criticizing Brown & Williamson). 
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In Holy Trinity, for example, available contemporary evidence
indicates that Congress never contemplated outlawing the employ-
ment practices of Christian churches, but sought only to curtail the
widespread industrialist practice of importing large numbers of
“cooly” foreign workers to take the place of American laborers on a
temporary basis at reduced wages, only to be sent back to their
home countries a few years later.213 Indeed, once the Holy Trinity
litigation raised the possibility that the statute might be read to
outlaw a church’s engagement of a foreign minister, Congress
swiftly passed an amendment exempting ministers from the stat-
ute’s reach.214 Although this amendment did not operate retroac-
tively to govern the outcome in Holy Trinity, its uncontroversial
adoption a few short years after passage of the original Alien
Contract Labor Act is powerful evidence that the Congress that
enacted the statute did not intend for it to govern the employment
practices of Christian churches.215
Similarly, congressional studies and legislative discussions about
the reserve clause during the fifty years between Federal Baseball
and Flood make clear that Congress shared the Flood Court’s high
regard for baseball and feared the damage that might be done to the
“integrity of the game” and the “chaotic conditions” that might pre-
vail if the reserve clause were eliminated.216 Likewise, Congress’s
compliant relationship with the robber barons who built the
213. See Chomsky, supra note 13, at 922-41. Chomsky’s thorough excavation of the
contemporary and legislative history surrounding the statute’s passage convincingly
demonstrates that it was designed to outlaw 
contracts that bring a body of poor laborers over here, paying their
transportation under an agreement that they shall work not alone till they have
paid their fare, but shall work for months and years for wages below those of the
ordinary American laborer—those contracts are shameful, they are criminal,
they are wrong, they are against natural right, against American law and the
spirit of our institutions. 
Id. at 930 (quoting 16 CONG. REC. 1259, 1625 (1885) (statement of Sen. Hamley)). Even the
chief opponent of this view, Adrian Vermeule, acknowledges that the statute was “aimed to
halt the importation of European and Asian manual laborers thought to be a degraded species
of immigrants harmful to American labor and institutions.” Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1846. 
214. 22 CONG. REC. 2955, 3245, 3428 (1891); see also Chomsky, supra note 13, at 936-38.
215. The original statute was enacted in 1885 and the amendment in 1891. Compare Alien
Contract Labor Act of 1885, 23 Stat. 332 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2164 (1901),
superceded by Act of Mar. 3, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, 32 Stat. 1213), with 22 CONG. REC.
3245, 3428 (1891).
216. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
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railroads at issue in Leo Sheep is well-documented and wholly
inconsistent with the notion that Congress implicitly intended to
limit the land rights conveyed under the Union Pacific Act.217 And
available contemporary evidence strongly suggests that when it
enacted the FDCA in 1938, Congress neither contemplated nor
intended to give the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products218
(indeed, the dissenting opinion in Brown & Williamson essentially
acknowledges as much).219 Finally, Congress’s enactment of two new
Indian preference laws involving government training programs
within months of amending Title VII is strong evidence that the
Congress that amended Title VII to cover federal employers did not
mean to eliminate the BIA preferences.220
But if the Court accurately gauged Congress’s specific intent in
these cases, then why are the cases so widely-criticized? And,
perhaps more importantly, is the unique national institution
exception on balance a good or a bad interpretive rule? The answer
217. See, e.g., DEE BROWN, HEAR THAT LONESOME WHISTLE BLOW: RAILROADS IN THE WEST
47-48, 58-59 (1977). It is well known that railroad lobbyists and industrialists enjoyed a cozy
relationship with members of Congress, sometimes bought through the issuance of railroad
stock certificates and land titles to representatives and senators. See, e.g., id. at 47, 58. As the
infamous Credit Mobilier scandal revealed, the Union Pacific laid track on the longest routes
possible to reap extra money and land from Congress and submitted highly inflated estimates
of railroad construction costs, bilking the Treasury of huge monetary grants—all without
investigation or objection from members of Congress, many of whom had been given stock in
the railroad. Id. at 58-59.
218. At the time the FDCA was enacted, it was understood that the FDA’s predecessor
agency, the Bureau of Chemistry, lacked authority to regulate tobacco products under the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, unless they were marketed with therapeutic claims. See
Bureau of Chemistry, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Service and Regulatory Announcements 21, 24
(Apr. 1914) (Feb. 1914 Announcements ¶ 13, Opinion of Chief of Bureau C.L. Alsberg).
Moreover Congress, in 1929, had considered and rejected a bill seeking to extend the Pure
Food and Drug Act to cover tobacco and tobacco products. S. 1468, 71st Cong. 1 (1929); see also
71 CONG. REC. 2589 (1929) (remarks of Sen. Smoot). In other words, when specifically
confronted with this issue a few years earlier, Congress had declined to give the relevant
agency authority to regulate tobacco products.
219. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 166 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In 1938, it
may well have seemed unlikely that the FDA would ever bring cigarette manufacturers
within the FDCA’s statutory language by proving that cigarettes produce chemical changes
in the body and that the makers ‘intended’ their product chemically to affect the body’s
‘structure’ or ‘function.’ Or, back then, it may have seemed unlikely that, even assuming such
proof, the FDA actually would exercise its discretion to regulate so popular a product.”).
220. See Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 235, 20 U.S.C. §§ 887c(a) & (d), 1119a
(Supp. II 1970) (requiring that Indians be given preference in government programs for
training teachers of Indian children).
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to the first question is simple: the cases are widely-criticized
because the Court’s constructions contradict the clear text of the
relevant statutes and single out one entity for special treatment
under the law. The answer to the second question is less clear. As
with most reference and substantive canons, the unique national
institution exception has both positive and negative dimensions.
On the positive side, as the above discussion illuminates, the
exception seems accurately to capture Congress’s probable intent
towards the special national institutions in question. Congress
probably did not want the general statutes construed in these cases
to cover churches, baseball, railroads, tobacco, or Native Americans.
Many consider the effectuation of legislative intent to be the most
important goal of statutory interpretation;221 by this measure, the
unique national institution exception is an extraordinarily useful
canon.
Further, the exception bears the refreshing advantage of promot-
ing judicial honesty. Some, such as the legal realists, would argue
that judges often decide cases based on vague notions about public
values and policies, but tend to couch their reasoning in traditional
rules and neutral principles without acknowledging the role that
public values play in their decision-making. If this is true, perhaps
a canon that allows judges to be open and honest with the public
about the background norms motivating their decisions—as the
unique national institution exception does—is to be welcomed. 
In addition, the important legal concept of reliance interests
supports the Court’s use of the unique national institution excep-
tion: assuming that the Court accurately has gauged the back-
ground public values giving rise to the exception, a statutory
construction that ignores the unique national status of the institu-
tions in question and subjects them to the general rule would upset
the settled expectations of private parties. Significantly, this is a
point stressed by the Court in Flood, Brown & Williamson, and
Mancari. In Flood, for example, the Court specifically expressed
221. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 105 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“[A] judicial decision that departs from statutory text may represent
‘policy-driven interpretation.’ ... As long as that driving policy is faithful to the intent of
Congress (or, as in this case, aims only to give effect to such intent) ... the decision is also a
correct performance of the judicial function.” (internal citation omitted)).
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“concern about the confusion”222 and the “injustices of retroactivity
and surprise which might follow”223 a judicial overturning of base-
ball’s longstanding antitrust exemption. Baseball owners had come
to rely upon and plan under the assumption that baseball was
exempt from the antitrust laws; to rule otherwise now unfairly
would disadvantage them in their business dealings with baseball
players. Similarly, in Brown & Williamson, the Court repeatedly
emphasized the FDA’s prior disavowal of any authority to regulate
tobacco products224 as well as the fact that “Congress, for better or
for worse, has created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco
products, squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction
over tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency from
exercising significant policymaking authority in the area.”225 The
upshot of these statements is that tobacco companies rightfully had
come to expect, and to rely upon the expectation that, they would be
regulated by Congress rather than by the FDA. Again, changing the
rules mid-game would have upset the tobacco companies’ settled
expectations and disadvantaged them unfairly in the conduct of
their business. Likewise, in Mancari, the Court repeatedly stressed
the “longstanding” nature of the statutory preference for BIA
employment of Native Americans.226 Although the Court did so to
demonstrate that Congress could not have intended to repeal that
preference, its reasoning also pointed out that a repeal would cause
Native Americans to lose a benefit upon which they had come to
depend.227
Finally, insofar as the unique national institution canon seeks to
effectuate public values and traditions established over time, it can
claim consistency with Burkean conservatism.228 Edmund Burke
222. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).
223. Id. at 279.
224. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125, 144, 146, 152.
225. Id. at 159-60.
226. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537, 548, 550 (1974).
227. See id. at 542 n.10 (stating “the obligation of honor of a powerful nation toward a
people living among us and dependent upon our protection” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1804,
at 8 (2d Sess. 1934)).
228. Edmund Burke was a political theorist and philosopher who served for several years
in the British House of Commons. See JIM MCCUE, EDMUND BURKE AND OUR PRESENT
DISCONTENTS 16 (1997). A contemporary of the founding fathers, Burke supported the
American Revolution and his ideas significantly influenced their vision of ideal government.
See, e.g., RUSSELL KIRK, RIGHTS AND DUTIES 119-25 (1997); RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF
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was a contemporary of the founding fathers and a passionate
defender of English custom-centered common law.229 Burke urged a
“custodial attitude” towards history and tradition and viewed the
preservation of past customs and practices as paramount to the law
and social order.230 Further, he disdained rationalism and abstract
reasoning as inferior bases for establishing the rules that govern
society.231 The unique national institution canon, in appealing to
history, tradition, and common practice to create an exception from
an abstract general rule—an exception that might have no basis in
rational, abstract reasoning—thus could well be seen as a respectful
judicial tool for maintaining a Burkean coherence in the law.
On the other hand, there are significant negative consequences
that may flow from the Court’s use of the unique national institu-
tion exception. First, there is a substantial danger that the excep-
tion will invite judicial overreaching by enabling judges to import
their personal predilections into a statute under the guise of artic-
ulating prevailing societal norms. Allowing judges to decide which
entities constitute “unique national institutions,” let alone selec-
tively to recount the nation’s history and traditions, is dangerous
business. Judges, for all their intelligence and education, are not
trained historians. Further, unlike trained historians, they do not
function in a medium that requires them to acknowledge the
personal biases that may cause them to slant a historical account in
a particular direction. In contrast to historical accounts, which are
to be as balanced as possible, judicial opinions are meant to be
authoritative and definitive. Indeed, when applying the unique
AMERICAN ORDER 382-83 (3d ed. 1991); Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America
(Mar. 22, 1775), in BURKE: SPEECH ON CONCILIATION WITH AMERICA 62 (Hammond Lamont
ed., 1897).
229.  J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia’s Unwritten
Constitution, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 19, 30 (2000).  
230. Id. (quoting EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS OF THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 33 (L.G.
Mitchell ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1790)).
231. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of Philosophers by the
Supreme Court, 65 U.CHI.L.REV. 1371, 1399 (1998) (“The Anglo-American legal tradition has
been heavily influenced by the conservatism of writers such as Burke, who focused on
practical wisdom and experience, and who were deeply suspicious of the rationalist
philosophers generating revolution and rebellion across the English Channel.”). Indeed, one
of the grounds on which Burke criticized the men elected into the Tiers Etat in France was
that “not one man was to be found” who had “any practical experience in the state” and that
“[t]he best were only men of theory.” BURKE, supra note 230, at 40.
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national institution exception in the cases discussed in this Article, 
the Court presented its account of American history and traditions
not merely as one view of the cathedral, but as the uncontroversial,
absolute truth—so universally accepted that Congress could not
have intended to legislate contrary to it. There is no room within
this framework for equivocal narration, and judges are rather more
likely to overstate than to hedge their historical accounts.
This is not to say that there are no constraints on the manner in
which judges employ the unique national institution canon. The
Court’s characterization of an entity as a national institution must,
of course, be grounded in actual historical practice or tradition.
Even when the exhibit-by-exhibit model of narration is not followed,
as in Brown & Williamson, the Court’s claims of historical privilege
for a particular American entity must ring true—and cannot be
conjured out of thin air by a justice on a policy mission. The Court
could not credibly claim, for example, that the United States is a
Muslim nation, that soccer is the American national pastime, or
that poppy seeds are a long-standing and critical feature of the
American economy. Indeed, the Court’s reluctance to wax eloquent
on America’s history as a tobacco nation in Brown & Williamson,
while still acknowledging tobacco’s “unique place in American
history and society”232 and factoring that history into its inter-
pretation of Congress’s likely intent, can be taken as a sign that
the unique national institution canon is grounded in more than
the whims of a particular authoring justice. Tellingly, Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion goes so far as to express doubt about
the merits of the regulatory approach adopted by Congress, stating
that “Congress, for better or for worse, has created a distinct regu-
latory scheme for tobacco products,”233 but nevertheless deems the
Court compelled to interpret the statute not to give the FDA
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco, given tobacco’s “unique place in
American history and society.”234 One thus gets the distinct feeling
that, in Brown & Williamson, tobacco’s unique national status
influenced the Court’s interpretation in spite of, rather than because
of, the authoring justice’s personal views.
232. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. Id.
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It may be, then, that a judge’s personal preferences play more of
a role in determining the manner and tone in which the unique
status of a particular national icon is conveyed than in determining
whether the icon’s unique status influences the Court’s interpreta-
tion. Still, judges do have significant discretion to portray these
national institutions as they wish, and they often are selective in
their depictions, emphasizing only the romantic tradition-bound
vision and ignoring any negative undersides. This is possible
because the constraints judges face in employing the unique
national institution exception are historical, rather than normative.
An entity need not have worked more good than harm in order to
qualify as a unique national institution; it need only be steeped in
American history and tradition. Thus judges are free, in characteriz-
ing a particular entity as a national institution, to wax lyrical on its
positive role in society and to leave out any negative undersides that
might detract from that revered image. Consider, for example, the
following table, constrasting the romantic view painted by the Court
in each of the relevant cases with the nasty underside which the
Court chose to ignore.
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TABLE 2235
Case Romantic View Nasty Underside
Church of the
Holy Trinity v.
United States
Christian Nation Religious Exclusion and
Prejudice
Ignores the 
Establishment Clause
Flood v. Kuhn Baseball as National
Pastime
Monopoly and Price-
gouging by Greedy Ball
Club Owners
Leo Sheep v.
United States
Land Grants To 
Build the Great 
Transcontinental 
Railroad
Robber Barons Cheat
and Overcharge 
Congress 
(Credit Mobilier 
Scandal)
FDA v. Brown
& Williamson
Tobacco as the Great
American Crop
Tobacco Causes Cancer
Tobacco as Crop of
Death
Morton v.
Mancari
Integration and 
Protection of Native
Americans
Stifling Paternalism 
Sanctions Racial 
Preferences
The unique national institution canon’s susceptibility to judges’
selective characterizations is, to say the least, troubling. In each of
the cases discussed in this Article, an argument could be made that
the romantic views presented by the Court as absolute truth were
shaped by the authoring judge’s personal feelings towards the
national entity in question. Justice Brewer was the deeply religious
235. Many thanks to William Eskridge for suggesting this table.
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son of a Christian missionary;236 Justice Blackmun was an avid
lover of baseball;237 Justice Rehnquist was a railroad enthusiast238
who once referred to Leo Sheep as his favorite opinion;239 Justice
O’Connor seems to have been sensitive to the health risks caused by
tobacco products;240 and Justice Blackmun was a sympathetic
champion of Native American rights.241
Equally troublingly, the unique national institution canon
violates the generality principle that is fundamental to our legal
system. The generality principle, put simply, dictates that a nation’s
civil and criminal laws should be applied equally to all its citizens.242
The generality principle has been described as the chief safeguard
against abuse and arbitrariness in a constitutionally limited
236. See MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
1837-1910, at 128-29 (1994) (discussing the influence of Brewer’s religious convictions on his
political and social beliefs).
237. See, e.g., Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box
145, 71-32 & Box 729, 71-32, Washington, D.C. In correspondence included in these papers,
Blackmun plainly states his fondness for baseball and his deep appreciation for the
opportunity to write an opinion about the game he loved. See also Linda Greenhouse, Justice
Blackmun, Author of Abortion Right, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at A1 (noting that one
of Blackmun’s “great loves” was baseball and that, when other Justices criticized the opening
of the Flood v. Kuhn opinion as “beneath the dignity of the Court,” Blackmun insisted that,
“I would do it over again because I think baseball deserved it”).
238. Notably, Justice Rehnquist devoted several pages in his book about Supreme Court
history to analyzing the growth of the railroad system. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE
SUPREME COURT 83-93 (2001).
239. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Supreme Court; Recalling Favorite Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 1985, at B8.
240. I am not aware of any definitive evidence of Justice O’Connor’s personal feelings about
tobacco products, but her votes in other tobacco cases at least circumstantially betray a lack
of affinity for tobacco. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (joining an opinion
allowing a claim that forcing a nonsmoking prisoner to breathe secondhand smoke could,
under certain circumstances, constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (joining an opinion
allowing most product liability claims against cigarette manufacturers to proceed).
241. Blackmun was known as “one of the strongest supporters of Indian rights on the
Court,” Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 762 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), and authored numerous opinions arguing in favor of protecting American Indian
litigants. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 529 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[G]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word[.]”);
Allison M. Dussias, Heeding the Demands of Justice: Justice Blackmun’s Indian Law
Opinions, 71 N.D. L. REV. 41 (1995) (discussing cases).
242. See, e.g., 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 112-15
(1973).
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government,243 and political scientists have argued that it is
essential to the prevention of rent-seeking by special interests.244
Failure to follow the principle, scholars have theorized, would result
in a government of men, rather than of laws, in which citizens are
ruled by the will of government officials rather than by neutral
principles,245 and in which special interests control government
officials.246 Viewed through this lens, the Supreme Court’s use of the
unique national institution exception thus far is not encouraging: as
discussed above, the Court’s break with the generality principle has
led to judicial opinions that appear very much to reflect the
individual will and personal tastes of the authoring justices.247
Further, it is difficult to ignore the fact that in creating special
exemptions from the general rule in Flood, Leo Sheep, and Brown
& Williamson, the Court twisted the statutory text to accommodate
three exceptionally wealthy and powerful special interests: rail-
roads, baseball club owners, and tobacco companies. Only once, in
Mancari, did it use the exception to benefit a disadvantaged,
politically powerless group—Native Americans. 
So what does all of this mean? In the end, is the unique national
institution canon more trouble than it is worth? I think the answer
to that question must be a qualified yes. The canon does promote
consistency with public values and traditions, but it also gives
judges far too much license to elevate certain institutions beyond
the reach of general rules of law. Moreover, the exception created by
the canon is not necessary to ensure a proper construction of the
statute: a direct focus on congressional intent almost certainly
would get the Court to the same result without carving holes in the
statute. Indeed, where Congress’s likely intent was to exempt the
entity in question from the statute’s reach, other tools of statutory
interpretation such as legislative history, contemporary statutes, or
the common law should demonstrate this and can be invoked to
reach the correct interpretation. Further, insofar as what we are
talking about is the default rule—that is, what to do when Congress
has not spoken on the law’s specific applicability to a particular
243. F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153, 169-70 (1960).
244. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROGER D. CONGLETON, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT
INTEREST (1998).
245. HAYEK, supra note 243, at 153, 193-94.
246. BUCHANAN & CONGLETON, supra note 244.
247. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
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entity—coherence and fairness norms argue in favor of a default
position that treats all entities the same, rather than one which
assumes the existence of special exceptions to the general rule.
The canon’s dangers render it all the more important that lawyers
and scholars be made aware of its use in statutory construction. If
the canon and its dangers are understood, then perhaps opposing
counsel will be more likely to present the nasty underside ignored
by those advocating that a special exception be made for a particular
national entity. Similarly, if the canon’s logical progression becomes
part of the interpretive lexicon, then perhaps judges will think twice
about signing on to an opinion that contains a seemingly harmless
national narrative or a statement that “X entity is special.” 
CONCLUSION
Most lawyers are familiar with the Christian-nation passages in
the Holy Trinity opinion and with the ode to baseball that begins
Flood v. Kuhn. A few also recall the railroad narrative in Leo Sheep.
But scholars and practitioners typically have dismissed these
narratives as fanciful excursions from the main text, taken by an
authoring justice for his or her own amusement. One aim of this
Article has been to shatter that prevailing view and to reveal the
significant role that such national narratives have played in the
Court’s interpretation of statutes. Another aim has been to demon-
strate that beyond these colorful narratives, and sometimes even
without using them, the Court has created a powerful interpretive
rule—the unique national institution exception from general rules
of law. 
This Article has argued that the unique national institution
exception is as much an interpretive legacy of Holy Trinity as is the
“spirit of the law” concept for which the case most often is cited. The
“spirit of the law” concept has been criticized roundly by several
jurists and scholars: Justice Kennedy has argued that excessive
reliance on legislative intent and “spirits” is merely a ruse that
enables judges “to discover an alternative interpretation of the
statute with which the Court is more comfortable.”248 Justice Scalia
mockingly has characterized the search for legislative intent
248. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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authorized by Holy Trinity as “a handy cover for judicial intent.”249
But, the Christian-nation exception created by the Court in Holy
Trinity—like the baseball exception created in Flood, the railroad
exception created in Leo Sheep, the tobacco exception created in
Brown & Williamson, and the Native American exception created
in Mancari—gives judges far greater leeway to “discover an
alternative interpretation of the statute” with which they are “more
comfortable” and to substitute judicial intent or policy preferences
for legislative intent than do arguments based on legislative history
or even the “spirit” of the law. Nevertheless, Justices Kennedy and
Scalia went along with the Court’s opinion in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson and seem perfectly happy to rely on public-norms-based
substantive canons as guides to statutory meaning. The irony in all
of this, then, is that the danger judges perceive themselves least
susceptible to may be the one that works the greatest harm. And in
the end, Holy Trinity’s least-appreciated interpretive legacy—the
unique national institution exception—may prove to be its most
dangerous.
249. Scalia, supra note 10, at 18.

